Essays in Labor Economics: Cross-Country Evidence by Stella, Luca

UNIVERSITY OF PADUA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Dissertation
ESSAYS IN LABOR ECONOMICS: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
by
LUCA STELLA
Doctor of Philosophy
2014

Contents
Introduction 1
Introduzione 3
1 Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital in Europe: Evidence
from SHARE 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5.1 Association between the Schooling of Parents and their Children . . 22
1.5.2 Causality between Schooling of the Parents and their Children . . . 26
1.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2 Living Arrangements in Europe: Whether and Why Paternal Retirement
Matters 58
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Data and Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
v
2.4.1 Bivariate Discrete-Time Hazard Model with Shared Frailty . . . . . 74
2.5 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.5.1 Model without Shared Frailty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.5.2 Model with Shared Frailty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.6.1 Instrumental Variable Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.6.2 Additional Sensitivity Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3 The Effect of Divorce Risk on the Wealth and Retirement Security of
Households 121
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.2 Data and Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
vi
Introduction
This doctoral thesis consists of three empirical research papers, in which intergenerational
links and their effects on economic outcomes are investigated.
The first paper, titled "Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital in Europe:
Evidence from SHARE", extends the previous literature on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of human capital by exploiting variation in compulsory schooling reforms across nine
European countries over the period 1920-1956. My empirical strategy follows an instru-
mental variable (IV) approach, instrumenting parental education with years of compulsory
schooling. I find some evidence of a causal relationship between parents’ and children’s
education. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large: an additional year of parental
education raises the child’s education by 0.44 of a year. I also find that maternal schooling
is more important than paternal schooling for the academic performance of their offspring.
The results are robust to several specification checks.
The second paper, titled "Living Arrangements in Europe: Whether and Why Paternal
Retirement Matters", uses retrospective micro data from eleven European countries to
investigate the role of paternal retirement in explaining children’s decisions to leave the
parental home. To assess causality, I use a bivariate discrete hazard model with shared
frailty and exploit over time and cross-country variation in early retirement legislation.
Overall, the results indicate a positive and significant influence of paternal retirement on
the probability of first nest-leaving of children residing in southern European countries,
both for sons and daughters. By contrast, there is no evidence of significant effects on
children living in northern and central European countries. I then discuss the potential
mechanisms by which paternal retirement may affect children’s nest-leaving. I find that the
2increase in children’s nest-leaving around paternal retirement does not seem to be driven
by changes in parents’ budget constraints. Rather, one must probably look for channels
involving negative externalities in preferences between parents and children.
Finally, the third paper, titled "The Effect of Divorce Risk on the Wealth and Retire-
ment Security of Households", quantifies the effects of divorce risk on couple’s retirement
well-being in Europe using changes in divorce laws occurred between the late 1970s and the
2000s. Across countries and over time, the ground for divorce shifted from mutual consent
to unilateral choice. This “divorce revolution” allows for the use of a quasi-experimental
design that exploits the time and country variation in these laws to identify the empir-
ical relationship between divorce risk and couple’s economic security in retirement. By
employing a unique dataset that contains complete marital history for different European
countries, combined with features of divorce legislation across countries and over time, I
can quantify their effects on the cohort of married couples born over the period 1920-1957.
Introduzione
Il presente lavoro e’ costituito da tre articoli accademici, di natura empirica, focalizzati sul
tema dei legami intergenerazionali e sui loro effetti su una serie di economic outcomes.
Il primo capitolo, "Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital in Europe: Evi-
dence from SHARE", estende la precedente letteratura sul meccanismo intergenerazionale
di trasmissione di capitale umano sfruttando la variazione nelle leggi di istruzione obbli-
gatoria in nove Paesi Europei tra il 1920 e il 1956. La strategia empirica e’ basata su
un approccio a variabili strumentali, in cui l’istruzione dei genitori viene strumentata uti-
lizzando gli anni di istruzione obbligatoria. Trovo evidenza di una relazione causale tra
istruzione dei genitori e istruzione dei figli. L’ampiezza del coefficiente stimato e’ grande:
un anno addizionale nell’istruzione dei genitori aumenta l’istruzione dei figli di 0.44 anni.
Trovo inoltre evidenza che l’istruzione materna e’ piu’ importante dell’istruzione paterna
sulla performance accademica dei figli. I risultati sono robusti rispetto ad una serie di
robustness checks.
Il secondo paper, "Living Arrangements in Europe: Whether and Why Paternal Re-
tirement Matters", usa dati retrospettivi di undici Paesi Europei con l’obiettivo di studiare
il ruolo del pensionamento del padre sulla decisione dei figli di lasciare la casa dei genitori.
Per quanto riguarda l’identificazione, uso un modello hazard bivariato con shared frailty e
sfrutto la variazione over time e cross-country nelle riforme pensionistiche. Nel complesso,
i risultati indicano un effetto positivo e significativo da parte del pensionamento del padre
sulla probabilita’ che i figli escano di casa per la prima volta nei Paesi del Sud Europa., sia
per i figli maschi sia per le figlie femmine. Al contrario, non c’e’ evidenza di effetti significa-
tivi per i figli che vivono nei Paesi del Nord e del Centro Europa. Discuto poi i meccanismi
4tramite cui il pensionamento del padre puo’ influenzare l’uscita di casa dei figli. Trovo che
l’aumento nell’uscita di casa dei figli al momento del pensionamento del padre non sembra
essere guidato da modifiche nel vincolo di bilancio dei genitori. Piuttosto, uno dovrebbe
probabilmente guardare ai canali che riguardano le esternalita’ negative nelle preferenze
tra genitori e figli.
Infine, il terzo paper, "The Effect of Divorce Risk on the Wealth and Retirement Se-
curity of Households", quantifica gli effetti associati al rischio di divorzio sul retirement
well-being della coppia in Europa usando le leggi sul divorzio avvenute tra la fine del 1970
e gli anni 2000. La ragione del divorzio e’ passata da mutual consent a unilateral choice.
Questa "divorce revolution" permette quindi di ricorrere ad un quasi-experimental design
che sfrutta variazione over time e cross-country per studiare la relazione empirica tra ris-
chio di divorzio e il retirement security della coppia. Utilizzando un dataset che contiene
informazione sulla marital history per differenti Paesi Europei, e sfruttando le leggi sul
divorzio over time e cross-country, sono in grado di quantificare il loro effetto sulle coorte
delle coppie nate tra il 1920 e il 1957.
Chapter 1
Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital
in Europe: Evidence from SHARE
Abstract: This paper extends the previous literature on the intergenerational transmission of human
capital by exploiting variation in compulsory schooling reforms across nine European countries
over the period 1920-1956. My empirical strategy follows an instrumental variable (IV) approach,
instrumenting parental education with years of compulsory schooling. I find some evidence of a
causal relationship between parents’ and children’s education. The magnitude of the estimated
effect is large: an additional year of parental education raises the child’s education by 0.44 of a
year. I also find that maternal schooling is more important than paternal schooling for the academic
performance of their offspring. The results are robust to several specification checks.
1.1 Introduction
The notion that there is a positive association between the educational outcomes of the par-
ents and their children is well documented. However, while there is a substantial consensus
on this intergenerational correlation, less is known about the existence of a causal rela-
tionship underlying the transmission of education between generations (see, for instance,
Black et al. 2005; Oreopoulos et al. 2006; Bjorklund and Salvanes 2010).
On the policy side, to the extent that policymakers are concerned about early school
leavers, an analysis of the mechanisms through which education is passed on from parents
to children is particularly relevant in light of reforms that extend the length of compulsory
6schooling. For example, if there is evidence that parental education is responsible for chil-
dren’s performance in school, then interventions that improve the educational attainment
of less educated parents should lead to increased human capital among their children, thus
reducing the degree of inequality of opportunity in education.
However, the primary concern is that intergenerational educational estimates might not
adequately account for the correlation between parental schooling and some unobserved,
inherited characteristics that might affect the academic achievement of their offspring.
Such correlations would imply that the intergenerational transmission of education could
be primarily driven by selection rather than reflecting a causal relationship running from
a parent’s to a child’s education. To address this concern regarding endogeneity caused
by omitted variables, the empirical literature has recently focused on three identification
strategies: twin parents (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002); adopted children (Plug 2004;
Björklund et al. 2006); and instrumental variables (Black et al. 2005; Oreopoulos et al.
2006).
In my study, I employ this latter IV approach that obtains identification from com-
pulsory schooling laws that influence the educational distribution of the parents without
directly affecting the children. In particular, this study is strictly connected to the seminal
paper by Black et al. (2005), which, using the Norwegian schooling reforms during the
sixties and early seventies, finds no evidence of a causal impact of parental education on
the next generation’s education, with the exception of the weak impact of maternal school-
ing on educational attainment among sons. Similarly, Holmlund et al. (2011), applying
this methodology to Sweden, obtain results in line with Black et. al. (2005). However,
these findings of limited effects of parental education in Norway and Sweden have not been
supported by studies for other countries (see, for example, Oreopoulos et al. 2006 for the
USA; Chevalier 2004 for the UK; and Maurin and McNally 2008 for France). Perhaps these
contradictory results are related to the relatively low levels of inequality with respect to
economic and educational outcomes in Scandinavian countries.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. To my knowledge, there are
7no studies that examine the causal effect of parental schooling on the human capital of their
children by exploiting the variation provided by compulsory schooling laws over time and
across European countries. Therefore, this paper adds to previous research by using this
source of exogenous variation in parental schooling to disentangle the direction of causality.
Another contribution of this paper is to shed new light on the different roles played by
mothers and fathers in explaining the transmission of education to their sons and daughters.
The findings from this multi-country analysis contribute to our understanding of how and
why education is transmitted across generations by accounting for the effects of different
institutional and cultural environments in Europe. A key element of my identification
strategy is that it makes it possible to control for both country fixed effects, which account
for time-invariant characteristics across countries, and birth cohort fixed effects for parents,
which will capture any systematic difference in schooling outcomes across parental cohorts.
To conduct this analysis, I draw data from the first two waves (2004 and 2006) of the Survey
of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This European dataset has three
important features: first, it collects data on the current economic, health, and family
conditions of over 30,000 individuals aged fifty and above in several European countries;
second, it provides information on educational attainment for two family generations; and
finally, as it is designed to be cross-nationally comparable, this dataset enables me to
properly conduct a multi-country analysis. Furthermore, I use data on reforms of the
minimum school leaving age by relying on recent studies (Brunello et al. 2009; Brunello et
al. 2012; Garrouste 2010).
Based on these data, my main results demonstrate that: a) when omitting country-
specific trends, there is some evidence of a causal relationship between parents’ and chil-
dren’s education. The magnitude of the effect is large: an additional year of parental
education induced by the reform generates 0.44 years of additional schooling for their chil-
dren; b) when including country-specific trends, the estimated effects of parental education
are no longer statistically significant. I argue that this lack of statistical significance can
be explained by the fact that the addition of country-specific trends greatly reduces the
8first stage power of my instrument; c) the mother’s schooling has a slightly stronger impact
than that of her husband on the academic achievement of their offspring with or without
country-specific trends. These findings are robust to a number of specification checks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
relevant literature on the intergenerational transmission of education. Section 3 presents a
description of the data and illustrates the main features of European compulsory schooling
reforms. Section 4 describes the empirical specification and identification strategy. The
main results of the paper are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 provides robustness
checks. I discuss the results in Section 7. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 8.
1.2 Literature Review
Over the last decade, several empirical studies have attempted to shed some light on the
causal mechanism that underlies the relationship between parents’ and children’s educa-
tional outcomes. These studies have proposed different strategies to identify exogenous
variation in parental schooling. In the literature to date, there are three main research
streams investigating the causal effect of parental education on their offspring’s education.
These streams differ in their choice of identification strategy. Below, I present a brief review
of these studies and explain my contribution relative to the existing literature.1
The first strand of the literature examines the causal relationship between parental
and children’s education using data on pairs of identical twin parents to difference out not
only family fixed effects but also unobserved factors due to the parents’ genetics. One
of the first studies, by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), compares the schooling of the
children of twin mothers and twin fathers who were identical in all characteristics except
their level of educational attainment. While Behrman and Rosenzweig’s findings suggest a
1A more detailed summary of the literature on each identification strategy may be found in Holmlund
et al. (2008); Bjorklund and Salvanes (2010); and Black and Devereux (2010). In particular, Holmlund et
al. (2008) argue that the conflicting results across these three literatures arise mostly from the different
identification strategies rather than from differences in the countries that have been studied.
9positive and large effect of the father’s schooling but no effect from the mother’s schooling,
Antonovics and Goldberger (2005) questione the validity of these results by demonstrating
their sensitivity to school coding schemes and sample selection rules.
The second stream of the literature estimates intergenerational schooling effects using
samples of parents and their adopted children. Sacerdote (2002) and Plug (2004) compare
adopted and natural children and conclude that environmental factors are important for the
intergenerational transmission of education. However, these studies were severely limited
by the paucity of data on the adopted children and a lack of information on the biological
parents of adoptees. To overcome these issues, the literature has recently made use of large
registry datasets of adopted children, which are available in the Nordic countries. In their
study, Björklund et al. (2006) improve on the previous literature by employing a unique
administrative dataset of Swedish adoptees that allowed them to examine the impact of
both the adoptive and biological parents’ years of schooling on the adopted child’s years
of schooling. They find both the adoptive and the biological parents’ education to be
important. Overall, studies on adopted children emphasize the importance of both genetic
and environmental factors for a child’s success in school.
Finally, there is a strand of the literature based on instrumental variables. This IV
approach is the one I apply in this paper, and is closely related to the seminal paper
by Black et al. (2005), which utilizes the Norwegian schooling reforms that occurred in
different municipalities for the period 1959-1973. This study provides little evidence for
the causal effects of parental education on children’s attainment. Overall, the authors
conclude that the father’s schooling has no impact on children’s educational attainment
despite a positive, but small, intergenerational effect between mothers and their sons.
Similar results were obtained in a more recent paper by Holmlund et al. (2008) applying
the same strategy in Sweden. In contrast to these studies on Nordic countries, Oreopoulos
et al. (2006), relying on variation in the school minimum age across states and time in
the US, demonstrate that increasing the education of either parent has a negative and
significant effect on the probability that a child repeats a year of school. This decline in
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grade repetition by children as a consequence of an increase in parental schooling is also
found in France (Maurin and McNally 2008). Using changes in the mandatory schooling
laws implemented in Britain during the seventies, Chevalier (2004) finds evidence of large,
positive effects of maternal education on her child’s education but no significant effects of
fathers’ education.
Taken together, these IV studies do not present a clear picture and reveal that, while
there is a large set of estimates of intergenerational mobility from a wide range of different
countries, the literature to date has not included a comparative analysis of educational
reforms undertaken at the country level. This observation strengthens my claim that
using this variation in European compulsory schooling laws is a novel contribution to the
literature that can improve our understanding of how and why parental education affects
children’s outcomes by accounting for institutional and cultural factors across different
European countries.
1.3 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the first two waves of the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which took place in 2004 and 2006 in nine
different European countries.2 This survey interviews individuals aged fifty and above who
speak the official language of each country, and do not live abroad or in an institution,
plus their spouses or partners irrespective of age. The main advantage of this data source
is the representativeness of the sample of elderly people in Europe because this survey is
constructed to ensure comparability of the analysis across the different countries. Further-
more, this survey is harmonized with the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). The survey also contains detailed informa-
2Altogether, 15 countries are covered by the first and the second waves, but I consider only a sub-group
of 9 countries for which I have information on educational reforms during the period between 1920 and
1956. Following Brunello et al. (2012), I exclude Spain and Greece because the compulsory schooling laws
occurred too late to identify a treatment group.
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tion on a broad set of variables: demographics, socio-economic characteristics, self-reported
health as well as social and family networks. In this paper, I present evidence for nine coun-
tries, for which I could compute some key educational variables. These countries cover the
various regions of continental Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Sweden and Denmark)
through Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands), and
from the Mediterranean area (Italy) to Eastern Europe (Czech Republic).
I also employ data on reforms in the minimum school leaving age across the above-
mentioned European countries, relying on recent works by Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello
et al. (2012) and Garrouste (2010). As in Brunello et al. (2012), Table 1 presents a
historical overview of the educational reforms that affected cohorts of parents from the
1930s until the late 1960s: for each country, the table reports the year of the reform,3 the
pivotal cohort (i.e., the year of birth of the first cohort affected by the reform), the change
in the minimum school leaving age and in the years of compulsory schooling prescribed by
the law, and the age at school entry. It is worth noticing that the countries selected for this
study have extended the school leaving age by one year or more, and that the Netherlands
and the Czech Republic experienced only a temporary reduction in the years of compulsory
schooling.4 Strikingly, although Italy had a lower initial level of mandatory schooling (5
years), it made substantial improvements during the postwar period (8 years). Note also
that, as the schooling reforms in the West German states occurred at different points in
time, Table 1 presents information on these reforms at the state level.5
3The listed year corresponds to the year when a certain reform was passed, which may not be equal to
year of implementation (e.g., the Austrian reform of 1962 was implemented in 1966; the French reform of
1959 was implemented in 1967).
4More details on the educational reforms in the Netherlands can be found in van Kippersluis et al.
(2011) and Brunello et al. (2012).
5See Pischke and von Wachter (2008) for more information on the educational reforms in the West
German states.
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Table 1: Compulsory School Reforms, by Country
Country Reform Pivotal Change in min. Years of Age at
year cohort school leaving age comp. educ. school entry
Austria 1962/66 1951 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Belgium (Flanders) 1953 1939 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Czech Republic 1948 1934 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
1953 1939 15 to 14 9 to 8 6
1960 1947 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Denmark 1958 1947 11 to 14 4 to 7 7
France 1936 1923 13 to 14 7 to 8 6
1959/67 1953 14 to 16 8 to 10 6
Germany (Baden-Wuerttemberg) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Bayern) 1969 1955 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Bremen) 1958 1943 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Hamburg) 1949 1934 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Hessen) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Niedersachsen) 1962 1947 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Nordrhein-Westfalen) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Saarland) 1964 1949 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) 1956 1941 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Italy 1963 1949 11 to 14 5 to 8 6
Netherlands 1942 1929 13 to 14 7 to 8 6
1947 1933 14 to 13 8 to 7 6
1950 1936 13 to 15 7 to 9 6
Sweden 1949 1936 13 to 14 6 to 7 7
1962 1950 14 to 16 7 to 9 7
Notes: Source: Brunello et al. (2012).
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The key variables of interest in this analysis are the educational attainment of parents
and children. I measure educational attainment using years of schooling. One unusual
feature of the dataset I employ is that it contains direct information on years of schooling
for both parents and children. However, while for countries in the first wave the data on
years of education are provided and are defined according to the ISCED-97 criteria,6 for
countries in the second wave there is information available on the country specific ISCED-
97 codes but not on years of education. In my analysis, the Czech Republic is the only
country included in the second wave that is not present in the first wave. I addressed
this lack of information on the Czech Republic by taking advantage of the country specific
conversion table that allowed me to recode the ISCED-97 codes into years of schooling.7
It is also important to note that the measurement error due to misreporting could be
magnified by the fact that children’s educational achievement is reported by their parents.
To construct the sample of parents, I restrict attention to married or cohabiting in-
dividuals with at least one biological child, and, following Brunello et al. (2012), I focus
on the cohorts of parents born from 1920 through 1956.8 These cohorts were affected by
the reforms of mandatory schooling that gradually came into effect across the European
countries. By comparing the year of birth with the pivotal cohort, I am able to deter-
mine whether parents were exposed to the changes in schooling laws. For the analysis
of this paper, it is worth stressing that I focus only on mothers and fathers who are the
family respondents, i.e., the first member of the couple interviewed, who was entitled to
respond to questions in the children’s section on behalf of the couple. This implies that,
while information on parental education was reported directly by both spouses, the data
6See http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm for details on
ISCED coding.
7The conversion table for the Czech Republic, which is not present in the Release Guide 2.5.0 for waves
1 and 2, was provided by the SHARE Country Team for the Czech Republic.
8After 1956, there is a substantial drop in the number of family respondents. The reason is that SHARE
interviews people who are 50+. Therefore, for the 2006 wave, the people targeted by SHARE were born in
1956 or before.
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on the children’s characteristics, such as years of schooling, were collected from the family
respondents.9 Therefore, parents who are not the family respondents are not considered in
my sample of parents. I then link the demographic and educational characteristics of each
child to the data for the corresponding family respondent to create an intergenerational
dataset. Because the early cohorts of parents are likely to be affected by the consequences
of World War II that might have forced them to interrupt or delay their academic careers,
in the robustness analysis I also construct a postwar sample that includes the birth cohorts
of parents born between 1935 and 1956, and show that the results are robust to excluding
the prewar cohorts.
In this paper, I restrict attention to first born children.10 The cohorts of interest were
born between 1956 and 1980. This interval presents two advantages: first, it guarantees the
absence of an overlap between parents and their offspring that could potentially undermine
the exclusion restriction of the instrument; second, it allows me to consider sufficiently old
children who were at least 24 years old at the time of the interview.11 The distributions of
the samples of parents and children across the countries are presented in Table 2.
9The family respondents answer the questions of the children’s section. The couple’s first person inter-
viewed is the family respondent in the coverscreen. Because the family respondents are selected exclusively
on the basis of the chronological order of interviews per couple, the sample of parents can be arguably
considered as a random sample. For further details, please see the Release Guide 2.5.0 for waves 1 and 2.
10In SHARE, questions about children’s education are asked for a maximum of four children. Table A3
in Appendix A displays the cross-country distribution of first-born and later-born children and Table A4
reports the descriptive statistics. Importantly, in Table A5 and A6 I show that the main results remain
substantially unchanged when including all children, both first-born and later-born children, thereby making
my results relevant beyond the first-born children.
11The first SHARE interview took place in 2004 for all countries with the exception of the Czech Republic,
which was surveyed in 2006. Table A7 in Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics for children born
after 1980 that are excluded from the analysis. As expected, the sample size is greatly reduced because
there is a small fraction of parents that had their children after 1980.
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Table 2: Sample of Parents and Children, by Country
Sample Parents (1920-1956) Children (1956-1980)
Fathers Mothers Total Sons Daughters Total
Austria 312 170 482 225 257 482
Belgium 454 275 729 363 366 729
Czech Republic 360 363 723 363 360 723
Denmark 174 146 320 155 165 320
France 372 268 640 332 308 640
Germany 339 333 672 346 326 672
Italy 464 487 951 495 456 951
Netherlands 464 460 924 465 459 924
Sweden 369 374 743 373 370 743
Total 3,308 2,876 6,184 3,117 3,067 6,184
Notes: All the samples contain individuals for whom information on education is not missing.
After these restrictions, the final full sample of parents consists of 6,184 family respon-
dents: 3,308 (53.5%) fathers and 2,876 (46.5%) mothers, while the final sample of children
consists of 6,184 siblings: 3,117 (50.4%) sons and 3,067 (49.6%) daughters.12 The sum-
mary statistics reported in Table 3 indicate, as expected, that fathers are older and are
slightly more educated than their spouses. Particularly striking is that the second genera-
tion of children has a considerably higher level of schooling than their parents (13.25 versus
10.71 years of schooling). However, part of the positive association between parents’ and
children’s education might reflect the positive correlation with unobserved ability.
12All of these samples contain individuals for whom information on educational attainment is not missing.
Table A1 in Appendix A reports the number of observations that are lost due to missing data on parents’
and children’s years of schooling for each country. Overall, it is reassuring to notice that the total number
of missing values is relatively very low (87 individuals). Table A2 reports the distribution of the postwar
sample of parents across the countries.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, Sample of Parents (1920-1956) and Children (1956-1980)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Children
Age 6,184 35.89 6.50
Education 6,184 13.25 2.84
Female (%) 6,184 0.49 0.5
Mothers and Fathers together
Age 6,184 61.85 7.19
Education 6,184 10.71 3.68
Household size 6,184 2.4 0.79
Fathers
Age 3,308 63.03 7.39
Education 3,308 10.98 3.74
Mothers
Age 2,876 60.50 6.69
Education 2,876 10.40 3.59
Notes: All the samples include individuals for whom information on education is not missing. Education
is measured with years of schooling and is defined according to the ISCED-97 criteria.
In Figure 1, I analyze differences in the pattern of educational attainment between
the cohorts of parents and children across countries. To facilitate comparisons, I separate
the countries into two groups: in one group, the Northern European countries (Sweden,
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Denmark and the Netherlands, see Figure 1a); and in the other, the Western (Austria,
Germany, Belgium and France), Southern (Italy) and Eastern (Czech Republic) European
countries (see Figure 1b).13 The vertical and horizontal axes describe the average number
of years of schooling and year of birth, respectively. The vertical dashed line marks the
year 1956 to separate the two samples. As one could expect, in all countries there is a clear
trend of rising levels of education, so that one might be concerned that it may be difficult
to distinguish the effect of the reform from the secular trend. Ideally, to thoroughly address
this issue, one would like to rely on a very large sample of parents born in the close vicinity
of the schooling law. Unfortunately, the sample size of my dataset is too small to conduct
this local analysis.
13Because my sample includes only one Southern European country (Italy) and only one Eastern European
country (Czech Republic), I included these two countries in a separate row with the Western European
countries.
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Figure 1: Trend in Education of Parents and Children
Figure 1a: Northern Europe
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Figure 1b: Western, Southern and Eastern Europe
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Notes: The vertical and horizontal axes describe the average number of years of schooling and year of birth, re-
spectively. The vertical dashed line marks the year 1956 to distinguish between the sample of parents (1920-1956)
and children (1956-1980). Because in my sample there is only one Southern European country (Italy) and only one
Eastern European country (Czech Republic), I put these two countries in a separate row together with the Western
European countries.
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1.4 Empirical Specification
Following Black et al. (2005) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006), I specify a model for the
children’s education in a multi-country framework as follows:
Educihj = α+ βEdu
p
ihj + γXihj + τ
p + τ c + ηj + pihj (1.1)
where the unit of observation i denotes the child-parent pair and the superscripts c
and p refer to child and parental characteristics, respectively. The dependent variable
Educihj denotes the years of schooling of the offspring generation, observed for child i within
household h residing in country j and is expressed as a linear function of parental education
levels measured by the years of schooling of the family respondent Edupihj . A key element of
my approach is the inclusion of both country fixed effects ηj that account for time-invariant,
unobserved characteristics, such as institutional and cultural features, that are likely to vary
by country, and birth cohort fixed effects for parents τp (in 1-year intervals), which capture
any systematic differences in school outcomes across parental birth cohorts. In model (1.1),
I then include birth cohort fixed effects for children τ c (in 1-year intervals) to control for
cohort trends in education and account for the possibility that some children might not
have finished school at the time of the interview.14 In some specifications, I also control
for country-specific quadratic trends in parental birth cohorts because the implementation
of the schooling reforms might be correlated with country-level, unobserved, time-varying
factors. Because many of the socio-economic characteristics of the parents tend to be
endogenous, as they are themselves affected by the parent’s education, I use a parsimonious
specification: I add a set of individual socio-demographic characteristics Xihj , including
the children’s gender and household size. Finally, ihj represents an idiosyncratic error
14One might argue that the birth year of the child is a potentially endogenous variable because parents
can choose the timing of birth. However, in the robustness checks I show that the main results hold even
when excluding cohort fixed effects for children.
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term. It is reasonable to believe that ihj is correlated with the outcome variable because
it embodies the unobserved factors of parents, including ability, which might affect the
academic performance of the children.
To distinguish between the intergenerational effects of mothers and fathers, in model
(1.1) I also include the interaction between parental education and the gender dummy for
the parents. By including this interaction, I am able to capture the differential impacts of
maternal and paternal education on children’s education. Formally, I estimate the following
specification:
Educihj = α+ βEdu
p
ihj + λEdu
p
ihj ∗ genderpihj + γXihj + τp + τ c + ηj + pihj (1.2)
where genderpihj is equal to one if the family respondent is the mother.
1.4.1 Identification strategy
I identify the causal effect of parental education on children’s education using compul-
sory schooling laws over 30 years as an instrument for the number of years of parental
schooling. A large body of economic literature (among others, Black et al. 2005; Ore-
opoulos et al. 2006) recognizes this identification strategy as valid because changes in
compulsory schooling laws produce variation in parental education that is credibly exoge-
nous and unlikely to be related to unobservable characteristics of the parents, such as
ability, that might explain the different educational outcomes of their offspring.
In this study, I apply this IV strategy to a European framework by instrumenting
parental education with the number of years of compulsory schooling determined by the
law.15 This multi-country approach has been employed by Brunello et al. (2009) to study
15The fact that the identification of the effects of the reforms is made possible through differences in
the timing of the changes in these laws across countries suggests some similarities with a differences-in-
differences design.
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the returns to schooling and Brunello et al. (2011) to investigate the effects of schooling
on health. Formally, the instrument is constructed as follows:
Reformpij =

(ycs)A if (parental year of birth)i>(pivotal cohort)j
(ycs)B otherwise
(1.3)
where the variable ycs represents the number of years of compulsory schooling, and
the superscripts B and A denote before and after the educational reform, respectively.
Therefore, I construct the instrument in such a way that it depends on three factors: the
country j in which the reform took place, the parents’ years of birth, and the first birth
cohort affected by the reform (i.e., the pivotal cohort). I can then determine whether
parents were exposed to the compulsory laws by comparing their years of birth with those
of the pivotal cohort.
Model (1.1) is estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS), and the first stage re-
gression is given by:
Edupihj = δ0 + δ1Reform
p
ij + piXihj + ϕp + ϕc + σj + υihj (1.4)
where Edupihj is instrumented with Reform
p
ij , the compulsory years of schooling in the
respective country and cohort. Similarly, the first stage for model (1.2) can be written as:
Edupihj = δ0 + δ1Reform
p
ij + δ2Reform
p
ij ∗ genderpihj + piXihj + ϕp + ϕc + σj + υihj (1.5)
Therefore, in equation (1.5) I employ not only the years of compulsory schooling but
also the interaction between compulsory schooling and the gender of the parent as in-
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struments. There are two points to note on this instrumental variables strategy. First,
because it varies over parental cohorts and across countries, the instrument is affected by
two potential sources of serial correlation: within country over parental cohorts and across
countries for the same parental cohort. To mitigate this concern, I cluster all standard
errors by the country and cohort of the parents, thus allowing for arbitrary dependence
within country-cohort cells.16 Second, the compulsory schooling reforms do not affect the
entire population. Rather, these reforms influence only the least educated groups of par-
ents. As a consequence, this identification strategy allows me to recover a Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) instead of averages across the population (ATE). As noted by
Card (2001), these local effects are of interest because the groups of individuals captured
by the LATE are those that are most likely to be affected by the mandatory schooling laws.
1.5 Main Results
1.5.1 Association between the Schooling of Parents and their Children
Table 4 presents the results from a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
of model (1.1). In column 1, I report the coefficient of parental education without other
controls: the OLS estimate suggests that a one year increase in the parents’ years of
schooling is associated with an increase in the number of years of schooling for children of
0.32 years. This coefficient is significant and robust to the inclusion of controls for parental
birth cohort and socio-demographic characteristics (column 2) including the gender of the
children and household size. When controlling separately for country fixed effects (column
3) and cohort fixed effects for children (column 4), parental education remains positively
and significantly associated with children’s education, although the coefficients are slightly
reduced to 0.30 and 0.29, respectively. I then include a full set of country indicators
interacted with a quadratic trend in the parents’ year of birth (column 5). The results are
virtually unchanged relative to the previous specification.
16As for Germany, given that the instrument varies at the state level, clustering occurs at the level of
the West German states. However, to account for potential correlation across West German states, I also
cluster at the level of Germany finding that the 2SLS standard errors are virtually identical.
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Table 4: Effects of Parents’ Education, Naive OLS
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child’s Education
Parental education 0.325*** 0.327*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 0.286***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Female (child) 0.204*** 0.217*** 0.225*** 0.225***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064)
Household size -0.135*** -0.121*** -0.170*** -0.176***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Socio-demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. for parents NO YES YES YES YES
Country F.E. NO NO YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. for children NO NO NO YES YES
Country-specific quadratic trends NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.178 0.190 0.228 0.243 0.247
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84
Notes: Birth cohort dummies for parents and children are in 1-year intervals. Country-specific quadratic cohort
trends are computed by interacting parental birth cohort and its square with country dummies. Standard errors
clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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To allow for separate effects of maternal and paternal education, I estimate model (1.2),
in which I include the interaction between parental education and a female dummy that
takes value one if the family respondent is the mother. The estimates for the most general
specification are reported in Table 5. Column 1 corresponds to column 4 of Table 4. The
inclusion of the interaction term (see column 2) reduces the magnitude of the coefficient
on parental education, but the OLS estimate remains positive and significant. While I find
only a slightly stronger relationship between maternal education and children’s outcomes
than between the children’s and paternal education, the coefficient on the interaction term
is highly statistically significant. Interestingly, this positive sign is consistent with the view
(see, for example, Black et al. 2005; Chevalier 2004; Chevalier et al. 2011) that mothers
are likely to devote more time to child care than fathers. This finding is discussed later in
the paper. Finally, in Table 5, I present similar results from dividing the sample into sons
(column 3) and daughters (column 4).
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Table 5: Effects of Parents’ Education on Sons and Daughters, Naive OLS
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Child’s Education
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Parental education 0.286*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.228***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Household size -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.154** -0.176***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.063) (0.055)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25 13.25 13.14 13.34
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.78
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and
children (in 1-year intervals) and country-specific quadratic cohort trends (computed by interacting
parental birth cohort and its square with country dummies). Standard errors clustered at the parents’
country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Overall, my OLS estimates confirm a strong, positive intergenerational correlation in
education even when country fixed effects are controlled for and the sample is divided
into sons and daughters. However, this positive correlation could be explained by the role
family background characteristics played in determining the children’s level of educational
attainment, or it might reflect genetic differences in ability that are transmitted to the
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children. In the next subsection, I attempt to establish whether this positive correlation
has a causal interpretation.
Furthermore, it is not surprising that in all specifications I do find a negative and sta-
tistically significant correlation between family size and children’s schooling performance.
In the more comprehensive specification (see column 5 in Table 4), a one unit increase in
the household size is associated with a 0.18 years decline in child education. This result
appears to be in line with the notion that there might be a trade-off between child quantity
and quality (Becker and Lewis 1973).
1.5.2 Causality between Schooling of the Parents and their Children
In Panel A of Tables 6, 9 and 10, I present the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates,
which are the primary estimates of interest in this study. To instrument for parental
education, I use years of compulsory schooling. Table 6 (Panel A) indicates that, in the first
two specifications, the coefficient on parental education is strongly statistically significant
(at the 1 percent level); adding country fixed effects (column 3) and cohort fixed effects for
children (column 4) to the model reduces the significance of the 2SLS estimate, but it is
maintained at the 10 percent threshold. The magnitude of the effect of parental education
varies remarkably with the specification and becomes substantially larger when country
fixed effects are added to the model (see column 3).
As emphasized by Holmlund et al. (2011), for the validity of the instrument to hold,
it is important to control not only for country fixed effects but also for country-specific
time trends to disentangle the identifying variation in parental education induced by the
compulsory schooling reforms from the confounding factors that arise from country-level,
upward trends in educational attainment. When I add country-specific quadratic trends in
birth cohorts to the model (column 5), I find that the estimated effects of parental education
are no longer statistically significant. While this lack of significance raises concerns about
the ability of my analysis to properly distinguish between the compulsory schooling effects
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and the positive trends in average educational attainment of the parents, I argue below
that this result can likely be explained by the fact that the inclusion of country-specific
trends markedly reduces the first stage power of my instrument. Interestingly, this weak
first stage relationship between the instrument and parental education when including
country-specific trends has also been found in Oreopoulos et al. (2006), who point to the
presence of contemporaneous trends of increasing both average educational attainment of
the parents and years of compulsory schooling.
28
Table 6: Effects of Parents’ Education, IV analysis
Panel A: 2SLS
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child’s Education
Parental education 0.281*** 0.367*** 0.498** 0.437* 0.468
(0.057) (0.054) (0.254) (0.262) (0.334)
Female (child) 0.206*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.238***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.069)
Household size -0.114** -0.123*** -0.150*** -0.159**
(0.048) (0.044) (0.056) (0.069)
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.175 0.188 0.179 0.214 0.202
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84
First stage F statistic 42.99 38.23 8.58 7.47 1.63
Panel B: First stage
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.632*** 0.604*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.104
(0.096) (0.098) (0.074) (0.076) (0.081)
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.062 0.081 0.221 0.258 0.262
Notes: Birth cohort dummies for parents and children are in 1-year intervals. Country-specific quadratic cohort trends are
computed by interacting parental birth cohort and its square with country dummies. Standard errors clustered at the parents’
country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Thus, I investigate the first stage estimates reported in Panel B of Table 6. These
estimates show that the reform is strongly and positively correlated with the number of
years of parental schooling and that its t statistic is above 2.7 even when conditioning
on country and cohort fixed effects. One notable exception, however, is the model that
includes the country-specific trends (column 5), in which the first stage estimate is not
statistically different from zero, with the t statistic of approximately 1.3. Panel A of
Table 6 also reports the corresponding first stage F-test statistic for each specification that
accounts for the clustering of the standard errors at the parents’ country and cohort level.
When subsequently including country fixed effects and cohort fixed effects for children
(columns 3 and 4), this statistic falls to approximately 7.5, which is below the cutoff value
of 10 suggested by Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997), but this value
is substantially higher than the first stage F-test statistic produced by the model that
incorporates the country-specific trends (column 5). Because of the lack of power in my
identification strategy after controlling for country-specific trends, I choose the specification
that does not allow for country-specific trends (see column 4 of Table 6, Panel A) as my
preferred one. In this model, my results reveal that parental education appears to have
a large causal effect on children’s education: I find that an additional year of parental
education will raise a child’s educational attainment by 0.44 of a year.
I also perform a number of weak-instrument robust tests that allow me to conduct
inference that has the correct size even in the presence of weak instruments. The results of
this set of tests are presented in Table 7, which provides the Anderson-Rubin (AR) statistic
(Anderson and Rubin 1949) and, as a reference, the standard Wald test for specifications
3 and 4 in Panel A.17 As one could expect given the relatively low value of the first stage
17Because my model is just-identified, the conditional likelihood-ratio (CLR) test converges to the AR
test, so there is no need to report both. In cases where the IV model contains more than one instrumental
variable, additional weak-instrument robust tests, such as the LM test, are presented. Notice that these
tests can only be applied to a model with one endogenous variable. A discussion of these issues can be
found in Finlay et al. (2009).
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regression F-test statistic, the AR p-value and confidence intervals are larger than the
non-robust Wald counterparts, but the differences are limited. Most importantly, the AR
p-value is still on the border of statistical significance at approximately the 10 percent
threshold. These results imply that, even when accounting for the presence of a weak
instrument, the treatment effects of parental education remain marginally statistically
significant.
Table 7: Weak-Instrument Robust Tests for models (3) and (4) in Table 6 - Panel A
Endogenous Variable: (3) (4)
Parents’ Education
p-value 95% C. Set p-value 95% C. Set
Anderson-Rubin 0.069 [-0.054, 1.292] 0.134 [-0.216, 1.235]
Wald 0.049 [0, 0.996] 0.095 [-0.076, 0.951]
Notes: Wald test is not robust to weak instruments.
For the above reasons, and in light of the Angrist and Pischke (2009) claim that “just-
identified 2SLS is approximately unbiased”, I conclude that in my preferred specification
(see Table 6, Panel A, column 4) the issue of weak instrument bias may be of less concern,
and that there is some evidence of a causal effect of parental education on the educational
attainment of their children. Table 8 summarizes the results of my favorite model. The
first column reports the OLS estimates from a regression of the child’s education on the
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education of the parents. In the second column, I display the reduced form coefficient from
a regression of the child’s education on the instrument. In the third column, I present
the first stage estimate from a regression of parents’ education on the instrument. In the
last column, I present the 2SLS estimate, where years of compulsory schooling are used
as an instrument for parents’ education. This latter estimate is simply the reduced form
estimate divided by the first stage estimate.
Table 8: Effects of parental education in the preferred model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Reduced-Form First stage IV
Dependent Variable: Child’s Education Child’s Education Parental Education Child’s Education
parental education 0.286*** 0.437*
(0.011) (0.262)
compulsory education 0.091 0.207***
(0.061) (0.076)
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.243 0.141 0.258 0.214
First stage F statistic 7.47
Anderson-Rubin test p-value 0.134
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year
intervals), and socio-demographic characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are
reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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While the main goal of this study is the analysis of the effect of parental education on
the second generation’s education, another contribution is the exploration of the different
roles fathers and mothers play in explaining the transmission of human capital to their
sons and daughters. To conduct this analysis, I proceed in two steps.
First, by adding an interaction between the gender of the parent and parental education
to the model (see model (1.2)), I am able to partially extend the analysis by allowing for
different effects of maternal and paternal education. This means that my preferred model
(see Table 6, Panel A, column 4) uses as instruments not only the years of compulsory
schooling but also interaction term between compulsory schooling and the gender of the
parent. The 2SLS estimates, reported in Panel A of Table 9, suggest that when controlling
for the differential impacts of mothers and fathers (see column 2), the results remain sub-
stantially unchanged with respect to the direction, magnitude and significance. Consistent
with the results of the OLS estimates, I find that the coefficient on the interaction between
years of education and parental gender is highly statistically significant (at the 1% level)
and positive, thus suggesting that maternal education is somewhat more important than
paternal.
33
Table 9: Effects of Parents’ Education on Sons and Daughters, IV w/o country-specific
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education
Parental education 0.437* 0.462* 0.553* 0.410
(0.262) (0.269) (0.300) (0.573)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.044*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.023)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25 13.25 13.14 13.34
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.78
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 7.47 6.99 7.56 2.00
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.207*** 0.226*** 0.301*** 0.153
(0.076) (0.077) (0.102) (0.094)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.048***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and
children (in 1-year intervals) and socio-demographic characteristics.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Second, in an attempt to disentangle the treatment effects of parental schooling on sons
from the effects on daughters, I separately consider samples of male and female children.
The results for sons and daughters are presented in columns 3 and 4 (Table 9, Panel A),
respectively. When conducting the analysis for sons, the coefficient on parental education
is statistically significant and larger than the coefficient generated by the full sample (0.55
versus 0.46 years), although the effect is less precisely estimated given the smaller sample
size. On the contrary, when examining the sample of daughters, the 2SLS estimate for
parental education falls to approximately 0.41 and is not statistically different from zero.
In columns 3 and 4, I also find evidence that maternal education seems to matter more
than paternal education in determining the educational success of their offspring. I explain
these findings in the discussion of the results.
The non-significant effects of parental education on daughters can be largely attributed
to the weak first stage relationship between the reform and number of years of parental
schooling (see Table 9, Panel B, column 4): the t statistic for the reform is approximately
1.6 for daughters compared to approximately 3 for sons (column 3). Furthermore, the
Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test statistic is approximately 2 for daughters compared to
approximately 7.6 for sons. The first stage estimates also reveal that the reform had a
stronger impact on fathers.
In Table 10, I repeat the analysis in Table 9 using the country-specific quadratic trends:
the coefficient on parental education is statistically significant, although very noisy, only
for the sample of daughters. As expected, in the first stage regression (see Table 10, Panel
B) the reform shows no evidence of being correlated with parental schooling. Interestingly,
the coefficient on the interaction term between the gender of the parent and parental
education remains statistically different from zero across all specifications, thus supporting
the basic finding that mothers have a significant stronger effect than fathers on the academic
outcomes of their offspring.
35
Table 10: Effects of Parents’ Education on Sons and Daughters, IV with country-specific
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education
Parental education 0.468 0.421 1.064 0.671**
(0.334) (0.272) (0.973) (0.334)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.047*** 0.079* 0.052***
(0.013) (0.043) (0.015)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25 13.25 13.14 13.34
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.78
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 1.63 8.64 1.39 4.04
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.104 0.124 0.153 0.092
(0.081) (0.082) (0.109) (0.108)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.045***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and
children (in 1-year intervals) and socio-demographic characteristics.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Regardless of the model, I find that the IV estimates are larger than their OLS coun-
terparts. While this result might appear to contradict intuition regarding omitted variable
bias given the positive correlation between parental education and unobserved ability, it
is consistent with several studies that employ mandatory schooling reforms as instrument.
Part of this difference can be attributed to two explanations (Card 2001). First, because
there might be important measurement errors in the self-reported schooling of the parents,
the resulting downward bias could be significantly larger than the upward omitted variable
bias. Second, as mentioned previously, this IV strategy captures the effect of reforms only
on the part of the population that is induced to obtain additional schooling by the edu-
cational reforms. Therefore, the treatment effect of parental education for this subset of
compliers is likely to be above the average marginal effect for the entire population.18 The
ratios of the IV estimates to the OLS estimates for the entire sample and sub-samples of
sons and daughters range from 1.5 to 2.4. Similar ratios have been found in Oreopoulos et
al. (2006), Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Staiger and Stock (1997).
18An additional explanation is that there might be some correlation between the instrument and the
unobserved factors that affect a child’s outcome. However, previous studies using this variation have not
questioned the exclusion restriction of the instrument.
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1.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I perform a variety of robustness checks to test how the results change
when I modify the sample or use a different instrument (see Tables 11 and 12).
Table 11: Robustness Checks, 2SLS estimates
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: Post-WWII sample of parents (1935-1956)
Parental education 0.470* 0.496* 0.558* 0.513
(0.259) (0.266) (0.293) (0.599)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.046***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 5,247 5,247 2,639 2,608
Panel B: w/o cohort F.E. for children
Parental education 0.498** 0.518* 0.603** 0.405
(0.254) (0.266) (0.279) (0.642)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.042** 0.057*** 0.026
(0.020) (0.022) (0.047)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
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Table 11 (cont.ed): Robustness Checks, 2SLS estimates
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel C: Parent’s years of schooling<11
Parental education 0.980** 0.982** 0.614 1.479
(0.492) (0.495) (0.603) (1.112)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.048*
(0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
Observations 2,829 2,829 1,407 1,422
Panel D: Narrow windows around the pivotal cohorts (+/- 6 years)
Parental education 0.813*** 0.658*** 0.896*** 0.651*
(0.147) (0.188) (0.138) (0.391)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.052***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Observations 2,804 2,804 1,382 1,422
Panel E: Binary instrument
Parental education 0.334** 0.360** 0.418** 0.302
(0.153) (0.146) (0.190) (0.242)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.036***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
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Table 12: Robustness Checks, first stage estimates
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: Post-WWII sample of parents (1935-1956)
Compulsory education 0.228*** 0.241*** 0.321*** 0.151
(0.082) (0.083) (0.104) (0.102)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.034*** -0.039** -0.029
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 5,247 5,247 2,639 2,608
Panel B: w/o cohort F.E. for children
Compulsory education 0.217*** 0.226*** 0.301*** 0.153
(0.074) (0.077) (0.102) (0.094)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.048***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Panel C: Parent’s years of schooling<11
Compulsory education 0.145*** 0.148*** 0.166** 0.110
(0.047) (0.047) (0.071) (0.079)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.007 -0.004 -0.008
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 2,829 2,829 1,407 1,422
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Table 12 (cont.ed): Robustness Checks, first stage estimates
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel D: Narrow windows around the pivotal cohorts (+/- 6 years)
Compulsory education 0.222** 0.236** 0.306** 0.173
(0.094) (0.096) (0.124) (0.129)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.034** -0.040* -0.028
(0.016) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 2,804 2,804 1,382 1,422
Panel E: Binary instrument
First reform 0.429*** 0.477*** 0.701*** 0.242
(0.160) (0.169) (0.225) (0.231)
Second reform 0.620*** 0.799*** 0.853** 0.710**
(0.204) (0.228) (0.343) (0.307)
First reform*female (parent) -0.107 -0.178 -0.030
(0.129) (0.163) (0.174)
Second reform*female (parent) -0.473* -0.476 -0.407
(0.273) (0.453) (0.564)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
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I begin by investigating whether my estimates are sensitive to WWII. The major concern
here is that, despite the inclusion of cohort fixed effects, the older cohorts of parents tend
to be positively selected on their health and other unobservable factors because these
individuals are still alive and able to participate in the SHARE surveys. While SHARE
data do not allow for the elimination of survivor bias and the identification of a sample
entirely unaffected by WWII, I can construct a postwar sample that takes into account the
consequences of WWII that might have influenced the educational decisions of the early
cohorts of parents by leading them to interrupt or postpone their academic careers. This
postwar sample contains the younger cohorts of parents born during the 1935-1956 period.
The 2SLS estimates reported in Panel A show that the effect of parental education is slightly
larger once the prewar cohorts are dropped, but this model displays an identical pattern
relative to the baseline specification (see Table 9, Panel A): the estimate increases from
0.49 to 0.55 years once I move from the full sample to the sample of sons and then decreases
to 0.51 years and becomes insignificant when I consider the sample of daughters. The more
pronounced impact of maternal education on children’s schooling persists, consistent with
the baseline specification. Therefore, the results are quite robust to excluding the prewar
cohorts.
I also investigate the robustness of my results to the exclusion of the child’s year of
birth. There might be a concern that the year of the child’s birth is an endogenous decision
because it may be affected by the level of parental education. In Panel B, I show that the
coefficients of interest are very similar to the main specification with regard to the direction,
magnitude and significance, with the only difference being that the mother’s schooling no
longer has an impact on daughters.
As a third check, following Black et al. (2005) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006), I conduct
the analysis on the sample of the less educated parents who are most likely to be affected
by reforms in mandatory schooling. Therefore, I examine the subset of children whose
parents have 11 or fewer years of education. The 2SLS estimates presented in Panel C
are similar in direction and significance to the benchmark specification, but the results are
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much less statistically precise. The lack of precision of the estimates is largely due to the
small sample size. Contrary to my expectation, I find the estimated coefficients to be much
larger in magnitude: the reduced number of observations is likely to bias my results, thus
limiting this type of analysis. The first stage estimates (see Table 12, Panel C) indicate,
as expected, that compulsory schooling laws are strongly correlated with lower levels of
parental schooling, except for daughters.
While the small sample size severely limits the possibility of using cross-country school
reforms as a regression discontinuity, one can imagine taking a narrow window of parental
birth cohorts around the pivotal cohorts to correct for the impact of any long-run trends
across birth cohorts. To do this, I restrict the sample to children with their parents born
six years before or after the change in the laws.19 The results reported in Panel D are
consistent with my baseline model: I find evidence of a causal impact, although larger in
magnitude, of parental education and a larger impact of maternal education on children’s
schooling.
As a final check, I assess the sensitivity of my estimates to the use of an alternative
definition of the instrument. I construct a binary reform variable which is set to one for a
given country for the post-reforms cohorts of parents, i.e., if parental year of birth exceeds
the pivotal cohort. This allows me to distinguish between the treated and untreated cohorts
of parents. Formally:
Treatpij =

1 if (parental year of birth)i>(pivotal cohort)j
0 otherwise
(1.6)
where the variable Treatpij is now an indicator that takes value 1 if parent i who resides
in country j belongs to a birth cohort that was exposed to the schooling reform. This
implies that the treated individuals are born after the pivotal cohort. Importantly, some
19For the countries with more than one reform, I consider only the most recent reform.
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countries implemented more than one compulsory schooling law during my observation
period: two laws were implemented in Sweden and France and three laws were implemented
in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. For the group of countries with more than
one reform, I construct a treatment dummy for each additional reform using the same
procedure as defined in (1.6).20 Therefore, the number of indicators corresponds to the
number of within country reforms. For the analysis in this study, it is important to note
that the indicators are set to zero when additional reforms did not take place in a given
country. One weakness of this binary instrument compared to the previous instrument
based on the years of compulsory schooling is that it does not adequately capture the
magnitude of the reform: a reform raising the number of years of compulsory schooling
by one year (Austria, for example) is treated in the same manner as a reform increasing
compulsory schooling by more than one year (Italy, for example). In this setup, the first
stage is given by:
Edupihj = δ0 + δ1Treat
p
ij,l + piXihj + ϕ
p + ϕc + σj + υihj , l = 1, 2 (1.7)
as mentioned above, Treatpij,l is a binary variable that equals 1 if the parent i in country
j was affected by the l − th educational reform and 0 otherwise.
The results are presented in Panel E. As expected, the magnitude of the effect of
parental education is smaller than in the benchmark specification (see Table 9, Panel A),
but, most importantly, the estimated coefficients remain unchanged with respect to the
direction and significance in the full sample as well as in the sub-samples of sons and
daughters.
20The third reform will not be used for causal interpretation because its identification would come only
from the Czech Republic and the Netherlands.
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1.7 Discussion
In this study, I found that maternal education is more important than paternal edu-
cation for the academic achievement of children. While this finding is consistent with the
established IV literature on the intergenerational transmission of human capital (Black et
al. 2005; Chevalier 2004; Chevalier et al. 2011), the mechanisms through which a mother’s
education may affect her child’s education are not entirely clear. In their studies, Chevalier
(2004) and Chevalier et al. (2011) emphasize that the stronger effects of maternal educa-
tion can be largely explained by the role of the mother as the main provider of childcare
within the family. For example, mothers tend to spend more time breastfeeding, reading to
their children, helping them with homework, and taking them outside. As noted by Black
et al. (2003), this stronger effect of maternal education could also be attributed to other
mechanisms such as positive assortative mating or the quantity/quality trade-off. However,
because educated mothers are more likely to work, they may also have less time to stay
at home and less time to devote to child care. However, Carneiro et al. (2013) counter
that more educated mothers do not spend less time with their children partly because they
have fewer children or less leisure time. They conclude that increased employment among
more educated mothers does not have negative effects on children.
Whether it is plausible to assume that the intergenerational mobility coefficient is the
same across different countries remains unexplored. To account for cross-country hetero-
geneity in parents’ education, I add to model (1) a full set of interactions between parental
years of schooling and the country dummies instrumented by the corresponding interac-
tions between years of compulsory schooling and the country indicators. I then test the
joint significance of this array of country-specific slopes in parental years of education and
demonstrate that I do not reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effect of parental
schooling is the same for all countries.21 An alternative strategy to allow for the maximum
level of heterogeneity at the country level would be to estimate separate models for each
21The results are available from the author upon request.
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country. However, the number of observations in each country is too small to identify the
treatment effects of parental education.22 Overall, the evidence presented above suggests
that the IV strategy on the pooled sample with common coefficients on all the variables is
most appropriate for the data used in the present investigation.
1.8 Conclusion
An important component of human capital can be assessed by the extent of individuals’
academic careers, measured by the number of years of education. When considering policies
that improve the educational outcomes of new generations, a key question concerns the
causal role of parents’ education in influencing the educational outcomes of their offspring,
that is, the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Does the increased education
of parents cause higher levels of education of their children? Or, is the observed correlation
between parents’ and children’s levels of education naive and due to unobserved covariates,
such as innate ability? Are there differences in the education effects of mothers versus
fathers, on daughters versus sons?
Although a large literature has attempted to answer these questions, the evidence
remains largely mixed. In this paper, I employ the changes in compulsory schooling laws
in Europe over the period 1920-1956 to explore the effect of parental education on the
schooling performance of their children. In my preferred model, I do find some evidence
of a causal relationship between parental and children’s education. Specifically, I find that
an additional year of parental education induced by the reform generates 0.44 years of
additional schooling for their children. Furthermore, I provide evidence that the mother’s
schooling has a stronger impact than her husband’s in determining the educational success
of their offspring. This latter result is robust to the inclusion of the country-specific trends.
The findings of this paper reveal that increasing the education of less educated parents
22The results are available from the author upon request. This country-specific analysis is usually not
conducted in the economic literature using SHARE data (see, for example, Alessie et al. 2013; Brunello et
al. 2009; Brunello et al. 2011; Brunello et al. 2012). Furthermore, the inclusion of only one country in
the Mediterranean area (Italy) and one in Eastern Europe (Czech Republic) makes it difficult to produce
separate estimates by European regions.
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might have beneficial effects not only on the targetd generation but also on the educa-
tional outcomes of the next generation because family background characteristics affect
the process of intergenerational transmission of human capital. These results highlight the
long-term effectiveness of compulsory schooling laws in improving intergenerational out-
comes in education. A mother’s stronger influence over children’s education suggests that
supporting the education of mothers may represent an important avenue for educational
policies.
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Appendix A: Supplemental Tables
Table A1: Missing data on education, by Country
Sample Parents (1920-1956) Children (1956-1980) Total
Austria 1 3 4
Belgium 3 7 10
Czech Republic 0 4 4
Denmark 1 3 4
France 8 8 12
Germany 6 3 9
Italy 0 4 4
Netherlands 14 13 25
Sweden 9 7 15
Total 42 52 87
Notes: The total amount takes into account the fact that there are seven cases of overlapping missing values
between the sample of parents and children (four observations in France, two in the Netherlands and one
in Sweden).
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Table A2: Post-WWII Sample of Parents (1935-1956), by Country
Country Fathers Mothers Total
Austria 261 150 411
Belgium 358 240 598
Czech Republic 295 351 646
Denmark 148 131 279
France 299 241 540
Germany 283 300 583
Italy 356 438 794
Netherlands 367 409 776
Sweden 292 328 620
Total 2,659 2,588 5,247
Notes: All the samples contain individuals for whom information on education
is not missing.
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Table A3: Sample of first-born and later-born children (1956-1980), by Country
First-born Second-born Third-born Fourth-born Total
Sons Dau. Tot Sons Dau. Tot Sons Dau. Tot Sons Dau. Tot Sons Dau. Tot
AT 225 257 482 172 171 343 67 63 130 24 21 45 488 512 1000
BE 363 366 729 281 259 540 120 100 220 52 37 89 816 762 1578
CZ 363 360 723 292 283 575 75 64 139 15 11 26 745 718 1463
DK 155 165 320 149 135 284 49 52 101 17 8 25 370 360 730
FR 332 308 640 224 247 471 102 96 198 33 29 62 691 680 1371
DE 346 326 672 252 218 470 90 80 170 20 20 40 708 644 1352
IT 495 456 951 369 339 708 141 125 266 45 43 88 1050 963 2013
NL 465 459 924 393 373 766 159 152 311 58 62 120 1075 1046 2121
SE 373 370 743 318 318 636 108 114 222 32 32 64 831 834 1665
Tot 3117 3067 6184 2450 2343 4793 911 846 1757 296 263 559 6774 6519 13293
Notes: All samples contain individuals for whom information on education is not missing. In SHARE, questions on the
children’s education are asked to a maximum of four children.
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Table A4: Summary Statistics, first-born and later-born children (1956-1980)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
First-born children
Education 6,184 13.25 2.84
Female (%) 6,184 0.49 0.5
Second-born children
Education 4,793 13.07 2.82
Female (%) 4,793 0.49 0.49
Third-born children
Education 1,757 12.76 2.90
Female (%) 1,757 0.48 0.49
Fourth-born children
Education 559 12.43 2.98
Female (%) 559 0.47 0.49
Notes: All the samples include individuals for whom information on education
is not missing. Education is measured with years of schooling and is defined
according to the ISCED-97 criteria.
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Table A5: First-born and later-born children pooled together, IV w/o country-specific
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education
Parental education 0.495** 0.538** 0.824*** -0.062
(0.239) (0.266) (0.305) (0.503)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.054*** 0.075*** 0.017
(0.018) (0.023) (0.031)
Observations 13,293 13,293 6,774 6,519
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.08 13.08 13 13.16
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.85 2.85 2.91 2.79
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 6.93 6.11 7.64 2.03
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.203*** 0.229*** 0.291*** 0.167*
(0.077) (0.078) (0.093) (0.093)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.082*** -0.085*** -0.077***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 13,293 13,293 6,774 6,519
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and
children (in 1-year intervals) and socio-demographic characteristics.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A6: First-born and later-born children pooled together, IV with country-specific
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education
Parental education 0.782 0.965 1.278* 0.776
(0.616) (0.865) (0.745) (1.286)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.080 0.105** 0.072
(0.055) (0.051) (0.075)
Observations 13,293 13,293 6,774 6,519
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.08 13.08 13 13.16
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.85 2.85 2.91 2.79
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 1.65 1.20 2.66 0.82
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.103 0.131 0.202** 0.065
(0.081) (0.082) (0.099) (0.101)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.081*** -0.085*** -0.075***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 13,293 13,293 6,774 6,519
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children
(in 1-year intervals), socio-demographic characteristics and country-specific quadratic cohort trends (computed
by interacting parental birth cohort and its square with country dummies). The Angrist-Pischke first stage F
statistic refers to the first stage regression of parental education; the first stage regression of parental education
*female has much stronger power, thus the Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic is omitted. Standard errors
clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Summary Statistics, Sample of Parents (1920-1956) and Children (>1980)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
First-born children
Age 545 21.18 2.18
Education 545 12.15 2.28
Female (%) 545 0.49 0.05
Mothers and Fathers together
Age 545 53.59 3.73
Education 545 12.29 3.56
Household size 545 3.46 1.01
Fathers
Age 353 53.88 4.06
Education 353 12.30 3.56
Mothers
Age 192 53.04 2.95
Education 192 12.28 3.57
Notes: All the samples include individuals for whom information on education is not missing. Education
is measured with years of schooling and is defined according to the ISCED-97 criteria.
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Table A8: First-born children born after 1980 - OLS, 2SLS and first stage w/o
country-specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: OLS - Children born after 1980
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education
Parental education 0.145*** 0.159*** 0.180*** 0.126**
(0.031) (0.035) (0.053) (0.061)
Parental educ*female (parent) -0.011 -0.005 -0.014
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 545 545 279 266
Mean of Dep. Var. 12.15 12.15 11.95 12.36
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.28 2.28 2.26 2.28
Panel B: 2SLS - Children born after 1980
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education
Parental education -0.025 -0.007 -0.033 0.178
(0.305) (0.305) (0.234) (0.389)
Parental educ*female (parent) -0.013 -0.014 -0.014
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025)
Observations 545 545 279 266
Mean of Dep. Var. 12.15 12.15 11.95 12.36
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.28 2.28 2.26 2.28
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 5.34 5.30 5.73 1.31
57
Table A8 (cont.ed): First-born children born after 1980 - OLS, 2SLS and first stage w/o
country-specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel C: First stage - Children born after 1980
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.544** 0.562** 0.914** 0.450
(0.236) (0.244) (0.380) (0.406)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.024 -0.052 0.030
(0.039) (0.062) (0.055)
Observations 545 545 279 266
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and
children (in 1-year intervals) and socio-demographic characteristics. The Angrist-Pischke first stage F
statistic refers to the first stage regression of parental education; the first stage regression of parental
education*female has much stronger power, thus the Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic is omitted.
Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Chapter 2
Living Arrangements in Europe: Whether and
Why Paternal Retirement Matters
Abstract: This paper uses retrospective micro data from eleven European countries to investigate
the role of paternal retirement in explaining children’s decisions to leave the parental home. To
assess causality, I use a bivariate discrete hazard model with shared frailty and exploit over time
and cross-country variation in early retirement legislation. Overall, the results indicate a positive
and significant influence of paternal retirement on the probability of first nest-leaving of children
residing in Southern European countries, both for sons and daughters. By contrast, there is no
evidence of significant effects on children living in Northern and Central European countries. I
then discuss and test empirically the potential mechanisms by which paternal retirement may
affect children’s nest-leaving. My results suggest that the increase in children’s nest-leaving around
paternal retirement does not appear to be justified by changes in parents’ budget constraints or in
the supply of informal child care provided by grandparents. Rather, one must probably look for
channels involving negative externalities in preferences between parents and children.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, a substantial body of research has attempted to identify some
of the potential determinants that may induce youths to continue living with their par-
ents. While this investigation is particularly relevant for Italy and some other southern
European countries, such as Spain and Greece, where young people tend to remain with
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their parents until their late 20s and early 30s, leaving home only when they get married,
the way children respond to these factors has attracted increasing attention in the public
policy debate of most European countries. For example, policymakers may be interested
in reducing the adverse impact of delayed cohabitation on an array of children’s outcomes,
including individual motivations and ambitions, reservation wages, labor market entry and
geographical mobility (Billari and Tabellini 2010). A further cause of concern regards
the phenomenon of falling fertility rates associated with prolonged coresidence. Combined
with the effects of population aging, this phenomenon raises the elderly dependency ratio,
thereby contributing to placing extra pressure on the long-term financial sustainability of
pension systems.
There is consensus in recent literature that in Italy parental retirement induces a signifi-
cant decline in the number of grown children living with their parents; however, researchers
are still puzzled about the possible mechanisms underlying this relationship. There are two
major competing explanations for this pattern. On the one hand, Manacorda and Moretti
(2006) argue that retired parents are no longer able to make a financial transfer to their
children and thus are unable to bribe them to stay at home because of the drop in their
post-retirement income. On the other hand, Battistin et al. (2009) emphasize that liquidity
considerations are unlikely to play a role because most Italian employees receive a generous
lump-sum payment upon retirement. Therefore, they suggest that parents may use part of
their severance payment to help their children leave the nest, which may account for most
of the decline in consumption around the time of retirement. While these two studies differ
in many respects, they have two important common traits. First, they use Italy as a case
study. The Italian case is of particular interest because Italy is among the European coun-
tries with the highest age for home-leaving and because it is one of the very few European
countries in which workers are entitled to receive a large severance payment at the time
of retirement. A second similarity is that both studies employ an instrumental variable
(IV) approach that obtains identification from Italian pension reforms that substantially
changed the eligibility conditions for retirement during the 1990s.
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Overall, the lack of a cross-country analysis severely limits the ability to clarify whether
the housing emancipation of young adults upon parents’ retirement can be attributed to
liquidity problems faced by parents, as suggested by Manacorda and Moretti (2006), or to
the receipt of a sizeable retirement allowance, as noted by Battistin et al. (2009). Thus,
there is the need for empirical work to test which of the channels dominates in practice.
I contribute to previous studies by taking advantage of a European dataset to test and
discuss the relative weight of these two competing hypotheses and shed some light into the
mechanism. To address problems of reverse causation, I estimate a bivariate discrete hazard
model with shared frailty (Abbring and van den Berg 2003; 2005) for the impact of pater-
nal retirement on the timing of children’s nest-leaving. Furthermore, to provide random
variation in the timing of paternal retirement, I strengthen my identification strategy by
employing changes in eligibility rules for early retirement benefits that were implemented
across European countries and during the period 1961 to 2007 as an exclusion restriction.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that makes use of this exogenous source
of variation to children’s living arrangements to assess whether and to what extent pater-
nal retirement caused their children to leave the nest. Compared to the linear IV strategy,
the hazard specification provides a more appropriate statistical framework for modeling
time-to-event/survival outcomes and accounting for right-censoring, thereby allowing me
to overcome certain limitations faced by previous IV studies. The bivariate hazard model
finally offers greater flexibility in handling nonlinear baseline hazards and nonlinear effects
of covariates and provides a novel approach to identifying treatment effects by modeling
unobserved heterogeneity explicitly through bivariate specification.
To conduct this analysis, I use data from the second wave (2006) of the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This European dataset has three
important features: first, it collects data on current economic, health, and family condi-
tions of over 30,000 individuals aged fifty and above in several European countries; second,
it provides retrospective information on the retirement age of the respondents and the
nest-leaving ages of their children; and lastly, because it is designed to be cross-nationally
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comparable, this dataset enables me to properly conduct a multi-country analysis. Fur-
thermore, I employ data about the European early retirement legislation by relying on
Angelini et al. (2009), Mazzonna et al. (2012) and the country-specific studies discussed
in Gruber and Wise (2004). It should be stressed, however, that across the countries
considered in the present investigation there are very different cultural histories, labor
market institutions and social characteristics. Such differences may play a lasting role
in explaining the substantial heterogeneity in the ages of children when they leave home
across Europe (see, for example, Aassve et al. 2002; Billari et al. 2001) and may not be
entirely captured by including country fixed effects in the model estimated on the pooled
sample from multiple countries. To mitigate this concern, I conduct the main analysis by
European region. These regions correspond to the geographical aggregation into northern
European countries (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands), central European countries
(Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium) and southern European countries
(Italy, Spain and Greece). This aggregation is particularly relevant because it reflects pro-
found differences in welfare states and family regimes across the above-mentioned country
groups (see, for example, Albertini et al. 2007, 2012). One implication of this division is
that the conditional impact of early retirement eligibility rules on paternal retirement and
children’s nest-leaving outcomes is allowed to vary between northern, central and southern
European countries.
Based on these data, my main results demonstrate the following: a) Paternal retire-
ment has a positive and significant effect on the timing of children’s nest-leaving in southern
European countries. In this European region, the magnitude of the effect varies between
1.4% and 5.5%, and there are no significant differences between sons and daughters. b)
The mechanism through which this pattern may occur remains an open issue because it
cannot be attributed to families’ liquidity problems or a severance payment at the time of
paternal retirement. One must probably look for channels involving negative externalities
in preferences between parents and children. c) In northern and central Europe, there is no
evidence that children’s nest-leaving outcomes are significantly affected by paternal retire-
62
ment. These findings are robust to a number of specification checks. On the policy side,
the results of this paper suggest that in southern Europe there are potentially unintended
and undesirable consequences of pension reforms on moving-out decisions of young people.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
relevant literature on children’s nest-leaving. Section 3 presents a description of the data
and provides background information on eligibility ages for retirement in Europe. Section
4 describes the empirical specification and identification strategy. The main results of the
paper are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 illustrates the robustness checks. I discuss
the results in Section 7, and concluding remarks are provided in Section 8.
2.2 Literature Review
A vast economic literature has investigated the channels that may affect young individu-
als’ living arrangements. Most papers have focused on parental and children’s economic
resources, youth labor market conditions, the prevailing characteristics in housing markets
and cultural factors. Among these channels, the father’s resources around the time of
retirement plays a dominant role. As discussed herein, although there is consensus that
parental retirement encourages the nest-leaving of Italian young adults, less is known about
the mechanisms underlying their departure from the parental home. In the literature to
date, there are two competing explanations for the change in the pattern of children’s leav-
ing home upon paternal retirement. The first explanation, proposed by Manacorda and
Moretti (2006), concentrates on the role played by parental preferences for co-residence.
Using the Italian pension reforms of the 1990s as a source of exogenous variation in house-
hold income, the authors find that the prolonged co-residence of youths can be attributed
to parents’ desire for cohabitation because they may be willing to give up some of their
additional income due to postponed retirement to bribe their children to stay at home
longer. This view would imply that once parents retire, they are no longer able to keep
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their children at home as a result of the decline in their post-retirement income. The second
explanation, that of Battistin et al. (2009), suggests a different mechanism. According to
these authors, because most Italian employees receive a sizeable severance payment upon
retirement, parents may use this money to buy a house for their sons and daughters, who
can then leave the parental home.1
These two studies, however, limit their analyses to the Italian case and do not test the
implications of their findings on other European countries. Therefore, the multi-country
analysis and the source of exogenous variation provided by the early retirement legislation
in Europe allows this study to address questions that other researchers have not. By
exploiting the intergenerational nature of the dataset, I analyze the decline in children’s co-
residence at the time of their fathers’ retirement. In particular, I provide the first empirical
test for these two competing explanations and shed some light on the specific mechanism
through which this may happen. As noted by Battistin et al. (2013), there could be an
additional mechanism that explains the increase in children’s nest-leaving around parental
retirement: for instance, if pension reforms force grandparents to stay in the labor market
longer and thus reduce the time devoted to child care activities with their grandchildren.
The authors find heterogeneous effects depending on the gender, with grandmothers having
a significantly stronger impact on their children’s fertility and nest-leaving outcomes.
This paper is also related to other contributions from the economic literature on moving-
out decisions. Most notably, Becker et al. (2010) show that high rates of co-residence
among young Italians can be the result of higher job insecurity compared to that of their
parents, whereas Card and Lemieux (2000) find that poor labor market conditions and
lower wages decrease the probability of leaving the parental nest. Another potential de-
terminant of moving-out decisions are housing market features. Analyzing living arrange-
ments in Italy and the Netherlands, Alessie et al. (2006) highlight that the presence of
high transaction costs in housing discourages home-leaving. Finally, this paper is related to
1Guiso and Japelli (2002) analyze the importance of this channel, finding that economic transfers from
parents contribute to earlier nest-leaving of their children.
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recent literature in economics that attempts to quantify the impact of culture on economic
outcomes, including children’s living arrangements. The starting point of this strand of
literature is the observation, by Reher (1998), that western Europe can be divided into
two groups: the southern European countries, which are characterized by the existence
of “strong family ties”; and the northern European countries, which are characterized by
“weak family ties”. According to this scholar, the late departure from the parental home
is one of the indicators of “strong” family ties. Giuliano (2007) studies the impact of
the sexual revolution of the 1960s on the propensity of adult children to remain in their
parents’ home and argues that high rates of cohabitation in southern European countries
can be explained by liberalized parental attitudes towards their children’s participation
in pre-marital sex. She concludes that cultural traits play a major role in determining
living arrangements. In a similar vein, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) provide evidence that
in societies with strong family ties home production and the proportion of young adults
living at home are higher, whereas labor force participation and geographical mobility are
lower compared to those of societies with weak family ties.
2.3 Data and Institutional Context
In my empirical analysis, I draw data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE). This survey collects key information on demographics, current
socio-economic status, health, expectations and social and family networks for nationally
representative samples of European individuals aged fifty and above who speak the official
language of their respective countries, and who do not live abroad or in an institution,
plus their spouses or partners irrespective of age. In this paper, I use data from the sec-
ond wave collected in 2006/2007. This wave is particularly suitable for my investigation,
as it provides retrospective information on the retirement years of the respondents and
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the year in which their children left their parental houses.2 The main advantage of this
data source concerns the representativeness of the sample of elderly individuals in Europe,
because this survey is constructed to ensure the comparability of the analysis across the
different countries. In this study, I present evidence from eleven countries for which I was
able to collect information on the legislated early and normal ages at which individuals
become eligible for a public old-age pension. These countries cover the various regions
of continental Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Sweden and Denmark), through central
Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands) and the
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain and Greece).
In my sample selection, I constrain the sample of parents to fathers because of the
problems associated with labor market interruptions that typically characterize the careers
of women of childbearing age. Manacorda and Moretti (2006) and Battistin et al. (2009)
also focus on fathers. Moreover, I restrict my attention to fathers who were either working3
or retired at the time of the survey, who have at least one biological child, and who were
born between 1920 and 1957. Overall, these cohorts of fathers were affected by changes in
the eligibility for old-age and early retirement benefits resulting from reforms that gradually
came into effect across Europe over the period 1961 to 2007 to respond to the demographic
transition. To construct the sample of children, I include all children, both first-born and
later-born children,4 and the cohorts of interest were born between 1940 and 1988. The
choice of this interval allows me to consider virtually all the cohorts of children who were
at least 18 at the time of the interview. I then link the socio-demographic characteristics of
each child to the data of the corresponding father to create an intergenerational dataset.5
After these restrictions, I obtain a working sample of parents that contains 4,935 fathers
and a sample that consists of 10,720 children (5,525 sons and 5,195 daughters). The
distribution of the sample of fathers as well as the sample of children across the countries
2Information on the year in which the respondent retired is available only for the second wave of SHARE.
3I use the term “working” to denote both the employed in the private or public sector and the self-
employed.
4In SHARE, questions on the children’s nest-leaving age are asked for a maximum of four children.
5To be more precise, I also include fathers who are not the family respondents.
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is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Sample of Fathers and Children, by Country
Sample Fathers Sons Daughters Total
Austria 242 278 255 533
Belgium 664 704 686 1,390
Denmark 407 478 421 899
France 543 588 606 1,194
Germany 568 585 546 1,131
Greece 300 339 298 637
Italy 629 655 673 1,328
Netherlands 518 593 590 1,183
Spain 361 442 385 827
Sweden 455 573 464 1,037
Switzerland 248 290 271 561
Total 4,935 5,525 5,195 10,720
Notes: This table reports the observations from the cross-sectional sample before
reshaping it as a longitudinal dataset. All of the samples contain fathers for whom
information on education is not missing and exclude children who were less than 18.
Descriptive statistics on the primary variables of interest are reported in Table 2. As
expected, the vast majority of the fathers (72%) are retired in the interview year of wave 2,
and approximately 30% of the fathers report their general health as being less than good.
The individuals in my sample of children’s generation are, on average, 38 years old, 52% are
men and they have much better educational outcomes than their fathers (approximately
67
40% of adult children have completed their undergraduate or graduate studies versus 23%
of the first generation).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, Sample of Fathers and Children
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Sons
Age 5,525 38.15 8.22
Nest-leaving age 5,525 24.92 4.83
High school 5,525 0.46 0.50
College or more 5,525 0.37 0.48
Married 5,525 0.72 0.45
Never left home 5,525 0.01 0.10
Daughters
Age 5,195 37.77 8.42
Nest-leaving age 5,195 23.61 4.30
High school 5,195 0.46 0.50
College or more 5,195 0.40 0.49
Married 5,195 0.77 0.42
Never left home 5,195 0.01 0.10
Fathers
Age 4,935 66.89 8.60
Retired 4,935 0.72 0.45
Working 4,935 0.28 0.45
Retirement age (retired) 3,553 60.34 4.73
High school 4,935 0.34 0.47
College or more 4,935 0.23 0.42
Bad health 4,935 0.29 0.45
Household size 4,935 2.23 0.57
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To determine the retirement age of the fathers and age at which children leave the nest,
I exploit recall information from the following two questions in the questionnaire asked to
the parents: “In what year did you retire?” and “In what year did the child move from the
parental household?”. The availability of such information relating events that occurred
at some point in time before the year of the survey is essential because it allows for the
creation of a retrospective panel dataset. For this reason to conduct the analysis, I assume
that individuals can locate past events along the time line with adequate precision. While
these retrospective data are self-reported and may be susceptible to recall bias (Gibson
et al. 2005), which could be amplified by the fact that children’s year of home leaving
is reported by their parents, the validation studies by Havari and Mazzonna (2011) and
Garrouste and Paccagnella (2010) find that the fraction of memory errors is likely to be
low, thereby confirming the overall accuracy of the retrospective information in the SHARE
data. An important caveat of my data is worth mentioning. With the exception of the
year of nest-leaving, I lack any source of time-varying information on children, such as
the year of marriage, the year young people left education or their employment history.
As discussed in the introduction, I conduct the main analysis by grouping countries into
southern (Italy. Spain and Greece), northern (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands)
and central (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium) Europe.6 Figure 1
illustrates the mean age at which children leave the nest by gender and country group.
As expected, young adults living in southern Europe moved out much later than their
counterparts in the other regions. To be more specific, compared to youths in northern
European countries, Italians, Spanish and Greek children left approximately five years later
(26.9 years in southern Europe versus 22.1 years in northern Europe). Young people in
the central European countries fall somewhere between these extremes. The figure also
shows the presence of a gender gap in nest-leaving age: daughters leave the parental home
6Southern Europe does not include Portugal because this country, which took part in the survey from
the fourth wave (2012), lacks information regarding the year in which the child left the parental home.
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earlier than sons, ranging from approximately 1 year in northern and central Europe to
approximately 2 years in southern Europe. This gap can partly be explained by the fact
that age at marriage, which is positively correlated with the postponement of home-leaving,
is lower for women. In Figure 2, I show that the proportion of married daughters is higher
than that of married sons across all European regions. Interestingly, in southern Europe,
the fraction of married individuals is markedly higher than that in the other regions.7
Table 3 reports the share of adult children that left home after paternal retirement, with
southern Europe showing the highest mean level, especially for sons.8
Figure 1: Children’s nest-leaving mean age, by European region
7The dummy variable is coded as 1 for married adult children living together with the spouse during
the interview year of wave 2 and 0 otherwise.
8Table 3 also demonstrates that gender differences within each macro-region are statistically significant.
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Figure 2: Fraction of adult children who are married, by European region
Notes: Marital status refers to the interview year of wave 2. This variable is coded as 1 for married adult children
living together with the spouse. Unfortunately, information on the year in which the child got married is not collected
in SHARE data.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, Children who left home after paternal retirement
Sample Sons Daughters Overall
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value
Southern Europe 1,436 0.45 0.49 1,356 0.38 0.48 0.00 2,792 0.42 0.49
Northern Europe 1,644 0.07 0.26 1,475 0.05 0.22 0.00 3,119 0.06 0.24
Central Europe 2,445 0.16 0.37 2,364 0.13 0.33 0.00 4,809 0.15 0.35
Overall 5,525 0.21 0.41 5,195 0.17 0.38 0.00 10.720 0.19 0.39
Notes: This table reports the observations from the cross-sectional sample before reshaping it as a longitudinal dataset. All of
the samples contain individuals for whom information on children’s nest-leaving age and paternal education is not missing and
exclude children who were less than 18.
With regard to the institutional context, I use data on early eligibility ages across
the above-mentioned European countries, building on the work by Angelini et al. (2009),
Mazzonna et al. (2012) and Gruber and Wise (2004).9 Figure 3 shows the distribution
of the actual paternal retirement age for each country. The vertical red and blue lines
denote, respectively, the eligibility ages for old-age and early retirement benefits, whereas
the red and blue areas indicate changes in eligibility ages for the cohorts in my sample.
As expected, there are sizeable jumps in retirement rates that occur at early and standard
retirement ages. The overall picture reveals that across eleven countries with very different
social security systems and labor market institutions, there are noticeable differences in
many respects. For example, the normal age of eligibility for pension benefits is currently
set at 65 in almost all countries, but ranges from a low of 60 in a couple of countries
(Italy and France) to a high of 67 in some Nordic countries (Denmark and Sweden). A
further feature worth stressing is that there is even larger multi-country variability in early
9Information on the retirement legislation in Greece is obtained from Duval (2003).
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eligibility ages. Especially striking is that the early retirement age ranges from 52 in Italy
before 1998 to 61 in Sweden after 1997.
Figure 3: Histograms of father’s retirement age, by country
Notes: Source: Angelini et al. (2009), Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012), Gruber and Wise (2004) and Duval
(2003). The vertical blue and red lines, respectively, mark the eligibility ages for early and normal retirement
age, whereas the blue and red areas represent changes in the eligibility ages for the cohorts in my sample.
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2.4 Empirical Specification
2.4.1 Bivariate Discrete-Time Hazard Model with Shared Frailty
In this section, I describe my approach to investigating the extent to which paternal retire-
ment affects the probability of the first nest-leaving of children. To do this, I use a bivariate
discrete-time hazard model with shared frailty.10 This novel strategy to identify treatment
effects in the presence of an endogenous treatment when both the treatment and outcome
are survival variables was pioneered by Abbring and van den Berg (2003, 2005). This class
of models is specified in terms of the hazard, defined as the conditional probability of the
event occurring at a point in time provided that it has not already occurred. In this study,
I am interested in jointly estimating a bivariate hazard model for the first episode of a child
leaving the nest (first equation) and the first time that the father retires (second equation),
allowing for correlations between the unobserved heterogeneity terms that affect these two
transitions (shared frailty).11 Formally, the model can be written in the following way:

θ1,it = λ1 (t)φ1 (Xiβ1 + δRetiredit + u1,i)
θ2,it = λ2 (t)φ2 (Xiβ2 + γEligibleit + u2,i)
(2.1)
where the unit of observation i represents the child-father pair residing in a given
country, the outcome θ1,it is the hazard that child i leaves the parental home at age t,
θ2,it refers to the hazard that father i retires at age t, and u reflects the individual-level,
time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity. The terms λ1(t) and λ2(t) represent the baseline
10The term frailty was first suggested by Vaupel et al. (1979) in the context of mortality studies.
11These two destination states are assumed to be absorbing. Although this assumption seems to be
natural for paternal retirement, it could be somewhat less intuitive for nest-leaving because the child could
go back to the parents’ home after the first move-out. Because information on whether the child returned
home is not available in the SHARE data, throughout the paper I assume that nest-leaving is an absorbing
state.
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hazard functions for the first and second equations, respectively. These functions capture
the time dependence of the transitions into the two states, and they are modeled using
a flexible piecewise constant function.12 Formally, the baseline hazard can be written as
follows:
λj(t) =
20∑
s
λjsIs(t) (2.2)
where j (j = 1, 2) refers to the equation, s indexes the 1-year intervals, and Is(t) are
dummy variables that take value 1 if the recorded duration is in the s interval. I use
an open interval from s = 19 until the last observation leaves the sample because after
19 years the survival and censoring times occur with insufficient frequency to use finer
intervals. Because I include a constant in the model, λ11 and λ21 are normalized to 0.
As for the hazard functions φ1 and φ2, my preferred specification uses a logistic regres-
sion. The variable Xi is a matrix of time-invariant, individual controls that may shift the
hazard. Specifically, I include household size, a dummy for poor paternal health that takes
value 1 if self-reported health is less than good, and an indicator for the father having a
college-level education or above (ISCED≥5, tertiary education) or a high school educa-
tion (ISCED=3 or 4, secondary and post-secondary education). I do not include paternal
occupation because of the large fraction of missing observations (approximately 30% of
the cross-sectional sample); however, education is strongly correlated with occupation.13
Both equations also entail a full set of country dummies that capture country-level, time-
invariant confounding factors affecting co-residence and paternal retirement. Such factors
might include, for example, cross-country cultural differences in preferences regarding co-
residence and retirement, attitudes regarding partnership formation and preferences for
independence. In the variable Xi, I then add birth cohort fixed effects for fathers (in
1-year intervals) to control for possible cohort trends in retirement, i.e., younger cohorts
12Alternatively, consistent with Melberg et al. (2010), I employ a cubic function of time, obtaining similar
results.
13An additional issue that would arise when controlling for paternal occupation is related to how to deal
with fathers who retired many years before their children’s nest-leaving. Moreover, because occupation
is an individual variable that usually varies over the life cycle, it is not straightforward to identify the
occupational spell that really mattered for children’s nest-leaving decisions.
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of fathers are likely to retire later, and include controls for the birth order of the child.
Retiredit is my variable of interest and is equal to 1 if father i is retired at time t. Thus,
the treatment effect δ indicates whether the child becomes more likely to leave the nest
upon the father’s retirement.
With regard to the unobserved heterogeneity terms u1,it and u2,it, I follow the latent
class approach adopted by Melberg et al. (2010) regarding the impact of cannabis on the
risk of consuming hard drugs and that of Angelini et al. (2013), who evaluate the effect of
illiquid assets holding on the probability of becoming a home-owner. Therefore, unobserved
heterogeneity is modeled assuming a discrete distribution that has two unrestricted mass
points.14 The intuitive explanation for the presence of these two mass points is that
individuals are clustered into two sub-groups that differ in terms of their unobservable
propensity for nest-leaving. For instance, one group is composed of individuals who appear
more likely to leave the nest later (labeled k = 1, Group 1, “low propensity” nest-leaving
types or “late” nest-leavers), while the other is more prone to leave the parental home
earlier (labeled k = 2, Group 2, “high propensity” nest-leaving types or “early” nest-
leavers). Consistent with Melberg et al. (2010), I then allow all the coefficients to differ
across the two latent groups; other studies (Pudney 2003; van Ours 2003; Salisbury 2012),
in which the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to affect only the constant term, limit
this flexibility.
Allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity is crucial to the identification of the
treatment effect δ, because there may be individual-level, unobservable factors, such as
paternal ability, that determine both paternal retirement and children’s decisions to leave
home. If unobservable heterogeneity exists and is ignored, the estimated coefficient may
be vulnerable to omitted variable bias. Moreover, the direction of the bias on the timing
of nest-leaving would be unclear. For example, higher ability fathers may be more prone
14A discrete distribution with two mass points is a flexible parametric distribution since it does not impose
any assumptions about the underlying heterogeneity other than that it can be suitably approximated by
two latent classes. As noted by Melberg et al. (2010), using more than two latent classes leads to some
convergence problems with the algorithm.
77
to retire later and may provide their children with more opportunities, thus making them
more likely to leave home earlier; however, these children may also be more selective and
hence more resistant to moving-out. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show that an
appealing feature of the shared frailty model is that it is identified without the need for
any exclusion restrictions or assumptions about the functional form of either the baseline
hazard or the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, as long as the actual timing
of the treatment (paternal retirement) is random and is unaffected by the anticipation of
the subsequent outcome (children’s nest-leaving). However, there may still exist concerns
that these two latter conditions are not entirely satisfied in model (1). The main threat
to identification is that, even once correlation between frailty terms has been corrected
for, the precise timing of the treatment may not occur randomly at year t, i.e., the “no
anticipation” assumption is unlikely to hold. As is well known, retirement is a life event that
affects various decisions of the family, including consumption, saving, fertility and labor
supply.15 For this reason, children may be able to predict when their fathers will retire,
and in response to this expected event, they may modify their lifestyle behaviors and their
propensity to become independent. Hence, the anticipation of paternal retirement by adult
children would violate one of the key identification assumptions described above, thereby
producing biased estimates. To circumvent this problem, I strengthen the identification by
providing an exclusion restriction for paternal retirement. The exclusion restriction that
I use is based on cross-country early retirement rules and is measured by the indicator
Eligibleit, which equals 1 if father i residing in a given country was eligible for early
retirement benefits at age t. These early retirement rules are not only correlated with
retirement decisions (Gruber and Wise 2004), but they also provide a potentially valid
instrument. Manacorda and Moretti (2006) and Battistin et al. (2009), using an IV
strategy, recognize this instrument as valid because pension reforms produce variation in
paternal retirement that is credibly exogenous and unlikely to be related to unobservable
15See, for instance, Battistin et al. (2009), Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), Battistin et al. (2013) and
Liebman et al. (2009).
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characteristics of the fathers that might explain the different nest-leaving outcomes of their
offspring. More importantly, it seems reasonable to argue that the timing of pension reforms
came as a surprise to the fathers directly affected as well as their children. The parameters
of the bivariate discrete hazard model should be interpreted in a similar fashion to a Local
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) in a linear IV setting:16 my identification captures the
effect only for the subset of compliers, i.e., fathers who change their retirement decisions
as a consequence of pension reforms. As a result, once the correlation between unobserved
factors across both equations and the non-randomness of the timing of the treatment have
been corrected for, the remaining difference between the probability of nest-leaving before
and after paternal retirement can be interpreted as a causal effect of paternal retirement.
To account for within family correlation, all standard errors are clustered at the household
level.17
To estimate model (2.1) using maximum likelihood, I expand the data from a cross-
section to a panel dataset by exploiting the retrospective information on the year in which
the father retired and his child left home. This means that each individual i (i = 1, ..., n)
is associated with multiple time periods ti (ti = 1, .., Tis), where Tis is the total number
of years subject i was at risk for the event.18 For simplicity of exposition, it is useful
to distinguish between the two equations (j = 1, 2) because they refer to two different
outcomes. For the first equation, age 18 is assumed to be the initial period in which the
exposure to the risk of nest-leaving begins,19 such that ti goes until the age at which the
first event is observed (the child’s departure from the parental home). If this event does
not occur by the end of the survey, then the child is a right-censored observation and ti
lasts until her age at the time of the interview. A similar reasoning applies to the second
16See Imbens and Angrist (1994).
17Alternatively, given that eligibility rules vary by country and paternal age, I cluster the standard errors
by these two dimensions and find that the results remain virtually unchanged.
18This construction follows Jenkins (2005) and Melberg et al. (2010).
19This starting age for children is consistent with previous studies (among others, Manacorda and Moretti
2006; Billari and Tabellini 2008; Becker et al. 2010). In my duration analysis, this assumption implies that
children under the age of 18 years are left-truncated.
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equation, where I now define the father’s age when his child is 18 as the onset of risk,20
thereby allowing ti to go until either the father’s age at which the second event occurs (his
retirement) or the father’s age at the time of the survey if the father is employed at the end
of the observation period (right-censored case). As a result of this reorganization of the
data, I obtain an unbalanced panel, as each individual in the two equations is associated
with a different number of time units. Furthermore, a new binary dependent variable yit
must be created. If individual i is right-censored, then yit is always equal to zero. If
individual i is not censored, yit takes value zero for all but the last of i′s periods (i.e., year
1, ...,Tis − 1) and takes value 1 in the last period (i.e., year Tis). After having experienced
the event, the subject no longer contributes to the risk set and is dropped from the sample
(right-truncated cases). One issue that arises in this particular setting is the possibility
that paternal retirement occurs after children leave the nest. While the majority of my
sample is composed of fathers who retire after the departure of their children, these time
observations would no longer contribute to explaining the hazard of children’s nest-leaving,
which is the relevant focus of this study. For this reason, these time units are excluded
from the second equation. It is worth stressing that one of the main advantages of the
duration analysis over a linear IV setting adopted by previous studies is the allowance for
censoring, which leads to the elimination of any constraints on the age at which children
left their parents’ home. For example, Manacorda and Moretti (2006) limit their analysis
to youths aged 18 to 30, whereas Billari and Tabellini (2008) and Becker et al. (2010) focus
only on adult children aged up to 35 years old.
Consistent with Melberg et al. (2010), the overall log-likelihood function for the bivari-
ate model (1) depends on both the hazard function and the survival function and is given
by:
20The vast majority of fathers considered in my sample are at least in their 40s when their child is 18.
The rationale for this lower bound is that even fathers in their 40s experience a positive, albeit small, risk
of transition into retirement.
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L =
n∑
i=1

2∑
k=1
pik

2∑
j=1

Ti,j−di,j∑
t=1
log [1− θj,it] + di,jlog [θj,it]


 (2.3)
where the probabilities pik represent the proportions of the sample composing each
latent class, and di,j is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if individuals are non-censored
and a value of 0 if observations are right-censored. It is worth noting that the likelihood of
the non-censored individuals differs from that of the censored ones. For the former group,
the likelihood is composed of two elements: the survival function from t = 1 to t = T − 1
and the hazard function in the last period t = T the subject was exposed to the risk.
For the latter group, because the censored individuals are never exposed to the event, the
likelihood is given solely by the survival function from t = 1 to t = T .
To maximize (3) under the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, I follow Melberg et al.
(2010) and employ the EM algorithm.21 This method begins with a vector of parameters,
α0, which includes β1, β2, δ, γ, u = (u1,u2), and the probability weights, p = (p1, p2),
associated with each of the two latent classes into which my observations may fall. Using
these parameters, I create a set of weights for each observation as follows:
pi0k,i =
p0kL
0
ki∑2
k=1 p
0
kL
0
ki
(2.4)
where pik,i represents the probability that individual i is assigned to unobserved het-
erogeneity group k. Thus, individuals are sorted into the most likely latent class to which
they belong, based on their observed outcomes. When probabilities of class membership
are estimated, I then construct an expected log-likelihood function, which I maximize over
21This is a commonly-used iterative procedure for computing the maximum likelihood estimates when
the data are incomplete or have missing values. See, for example, Heckman and Singer (1984) and Ng et
al. (1995).
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α to obtain α1. Using α1, I create a new set of weights, pi1, and repeat the algorithm until
convergence.
2.5 Main Results
Before presenting estimates of the model described in the previous section, I provide a visual
analysis of the evolution of the estimated hazard functions for nest-leaving and paternal re-
tirement, which are estimated non-parametrically using a kernel-smoothing methodology.22
In particular, Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of nest-leaving for each European region, with
the variable time measured in terms of the number of years since the child turned 18.23
Overall, this figure notes a number of cross-region differences. These differences include
the following: a) in the beginning, in northern Europe, the hazard of nest-leaving for sons
and daughters is considerably higher compared to that in the other country regions; b) in
all country groups, daughters initially have significantly higher rates of nest-leaving com-
pared to those of sons;24 c) in southern Europe, there is a proportion of adult children who
are at high risk of leaving home even when they are in their 40s, thereby providing fur-
ther evidence about the prolonged cohabitation of Mediterranean youths in their parents’
homes.
Finally, Figure 5 displays the dynamics of the hazard for paternal retirement. As
expected, in all European regions, the hazard of paternal retirement increases with time.
It is also evident that fathers living in southern Europe are initially at higher risk of
transition into retirement. This result is consistent with the evidence indicating that
southern European individuals tend to retire earlier.
22This is done using the STS package in STATA. See Cleves et al. (2010) for further details.
23Notice that the reason why the smoothed hazard estimate is not depicted for t < 5 has to do with the
choice of the bandwidth.
24For each country group, the log-rank and Wilcoxon tests clearly reject the null hypothesis that the
survivor functions of sons and daughters are the same.
82
Figure 4: Empirical hazard rate of children’s nest-leaving and fathers’ retirement, by
European region
Notes: This figure plots the estimated hazard function of nest-leaving of children and that of paternal retire-
ment by European region. These hazard functions are estimated using a nonparametric kernel-smoothing
methodology (STS package in STATA). Notice that the reason why the smoothed hazard estimate is not
depicted for t < 5 has to do with the choice of the bandwidth. Recall that children who were less than 18
are left-truncated.
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Figure 5: Empirical hazard rate of fathers’ retirement, by European region
Notes: This figure plots the estimated hazard function of nest-leaving of children and that of paternal retire-
ment by European region. These hazard functions are estimated using a nonparametric kernel-smoothing
methodology (STS package in STATA). Notice that the reason why the smoothed hazard estimate is not
depicted for t < 5 has to do with the choice of the bandwidth. Recall that children who were less than 18
are left-truncated.
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2.5.1 Model without Shared Frailty
I begin by estimating a discrete-time duration model for the hazards of children leaving
the nest and paternal retirement without correcting for correlated unobserved heterogene-
ity. Thus, each equation in model (1) is estimated using a separate logistic hazard equation.
Table 4 contains the results, with average marginal effects of covariates on the hazard as-
sociated with retirement listed next to their average marginal effects on the hazard of
children’s nest-leaving. In each specification, I include country fixed effects, cohort fixed
effects for fathers and a set of controls such as household size, an indicator for paternal
poor health and educational achievement. Specifically, in columns 1, 3 and 5, I estimate
the equation explaining the probability of leaving the nest for the first time by dividing the
sample into southern, northern and central European countries. When examining southern
Europe (see column 1), I find that the estimated effect of paternal retirement is positive
and strongly statistically significant (at the 1% level). Paternal retirement implies an in-
crease in the probability of children’s nest-leaving of 2.3%. However, when focusing on
the northern and central European countries (see columns 3 and 5), the coefficient on pa-
ternal retirement becomes insignificant, and the magnitude is reduced to 0.017 and 0.003,
respectively. As expected, in each macro-region, the eligibility status for early retirement
benefits matters for the hazard of paternal retirement (see columns 2, 4 and 6). While
eligible fathers are more likely to retire, the differences in the magnitude of the coefficient
on paternal eligibility are remarkable, ranging from 3.2% in northern Europe to 8.9% in
southern Europe. In columns 7 and 8, I separately estimate the two equations in model
(1) using the pooled sample. Interestingly, the point estimate of the coefficient of inter-
est remains positive and significant, with a magnitude of 0.021. It seems clear that this
significant impact on the full sample is driven by the highly significant effects of paternal
retirement obtained from the regression on the sample of southern European countries (see
column 1). Moreover, I find that coefficients on household size are quite small in magnitude
and change signs across the various subsamples for both risks, indicating that household
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size is not the most important factor for children’s nest-leaving or paternal retirement. A
similar observation applies to the coefficients on fathers’ poor health, which seems to play
a very limited role in explaining these two risks. Overall, it is difficult to extrapolate any
systematic or interesting patterns from these coefficients.
In sum, although these correlations may suffer from problems of confounding, they
provide a first indication that paternal retirement is associated with a higher probability of
first nest-leaving by children (first equation) only in the Mediterranean countries, and that
early retirement rules strongly predict the hazard of paternal retirement (second equation).
In the next subsection, I attempt to establish whether this positive correlation has a causal
interpretation.
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Table 4: Model without shared frailty - Determinants of the Hazard of Nest-Leaving and
Retirement
Sample Southern Europe Northern Europe Central Europe Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome Nest-leaving Ret. Nest-leaving Ret. Nest-leaving Ret. Nest-leaving Ret.
Father is retired 0.023*** 0.017 0.003 0.021***
(0.005) (0.030) (0.009) (0.005)
Father is eligible 0.089*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.055***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Household size -0.006** 0.002 0.013*** -0.001 -0.012*** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Bad health (father) 0.005 0.004 -0.029*** 0.004* -0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.003*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -7,883 -3,185 -6,950 -710 -12,236 -2,298 -27,684 -6,485
Observations 24,530 18,806 13,197 12,597 28,698 23,682 66,425 55,085
Notes: Logit estimations; average marginal effects reported. The sample sizes take into account the longitudinal structure of the
data. Education is an indicator for father’s college or more (ISCED≥ 5, tertiaty education) and high school education (ISCED=3
or 4, secondary and post-secondary education). Bad health is an indicator that takes value 1 if father’s self-reported health is less
than good. All specifications include time dummies representing duration dependence. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the household level.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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2.5.2 Model with Shared Frailty
The primary concern about the point estimates presented in Table 4 is that they may
not adequately account for the correlation between unobserved characteristics that affect
children’s nest-leaving and unobserved factors that determine paternal retirement, thereby
generating omitted variable bias.
To address this concern, I allow for the possibility of correlated unobserved heterogene-
ity terms across both equations by using the latent class approach adopted by Melberg et
al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2013), in which individuals are divided into two sub-groups
of the population. Table 5 presents the estimation results of logistic regressions on the haz-
ard of nest-leaving. As mentioned in the previous subsection, average marginal effects are
calculated for each European region (columns 1 to 9) and for the pooled sample (columns
10 to 12). To account for unobservable differences between southern, northern and central
Europe, I allow the frailty to vary across these regions. Thus, I separately estimate the
probability weights attached to the unobserved heterogeneity Group 1 and Group 2 for
each European region as well as for the full sample. The estimated probabilities, pˆi1 and
pˆi2 , are also listed in Table 5.
In particular, in columns 1 to 3, I focus on southern European countries. To facilitate
comparisons, in column 1, I report the average marginal effects corresponding to the model
in which unobserved heterogeneity is ignored (see, also, column 1 of Table 4). In columns
2 and 3, I present the same predicted effects when unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for
by using the probabilities of belonging to Group 1 and Group 2 as weights, respectively.
This means that a different logistic hazard regression is estimated for each of the two
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groups. The results suggest that paternal retirement is a statistically significant predictor
of children’s nest-leaving. For those belonging to Group 1, the treatment effect of paternal
retirement is positive and strongly statistically significant (at the 1% level). With respect
to the magnitude, paternal retirement increases the probability of children’s first nest-
leaving by 5.5%. The treatment effect remains highly significant, albeit quantitatively less
important (1.4%), for those who belong to Group 2.
To learn more about the characteristics of the two groups, Table 6 displays summary
statistics on selected covariates.25 Specifically, individuals in the sample with a predicted
probability of falling into Group 1 below the median are assigned to that group, whereas the
remaining individuals are placed in Group 2. As evidenced in Panel A (southern Europe),
these two groups differ substantially with respect to the proportion of retired fathers.
For Group 1, this proportion is approximately 12% greater than the mean of the entire
sample (25% versus 22%) and approximately 27% greater than the mean of Group 2 (25%
versus 19%). Such significant differences in the fraction of retired fathers can contribute to
explaining why young people in Group 1 (“low propensity” nest-leaving types) are much
more affected by paternal retirement than their counterparts in Group 2 (“high propensity”
nest-leaving types). Interestingly, these two groups also differ significantly in a number of
other observable characteristics, such as educational outcomes and children’s age at time of
leaving home. For instance, adult children in Group 1 are more likely to leave the parental
home later and have better outcomes in terms of their own and their fathers’ education.
25Household size and paternal health status are not shown to save space. However, they are not found
to display any significant differences between Group 1 and Group 2.
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Table 6: Model with shared frailty - Differences between clusters, by European region and full
sample
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Full sample - No Het.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value
Panel A: Southern Europe (pˆi1 = 0.33, pˆi2 = 0.67)
Father is retired 0.247 0.431 0.195 0.397 0.000 0.221 0.415
Male (child) 0.570 0.495 0.578 0.494 0.180 0.574 0.495
Married (child) 0.834 0.372 0.831 0.374 0.518 0.833 0.373
High school (father) 0.150 0.357 0.136 0.342 0.001 0.143 0.349
College or more (father) 0.084 0.277 0.073 0.259 0.000 0.078 0.268
High school (child) 0.403 0.490 0.423 0.494 0.001 0.413 0.492
College or more (child) 0.301 0.459 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.268 0.442
Nest-leaving age 30.078 5.268 29.325 5.262 0.000 29.701 5.278
Panel B: Northern Europe (pˆi1 = 0.07, pˆi2 = 0.93)
Father is retired 0.072 0.259 0.018 0.132 0.000 0.045 0.207
Male (child) 0.610 0.488 0.563 0.496 0.000 0.587 0.492
Married (child) 0.708 0.455 0.678 0.467 0.000 0.693 0.461
High school (father) 0.277 0.448 0.350 0.477 0.000 0.314 0.463
College or more (father) 0.213 0.409 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.247 0.431
High school (child) 0.463 0.499 0.459 0.498 0.656 0.461 0.498
College or more (child) 0.350 0.477 0.388 0.487 0.000 0.369 0.482
Nest-leaving age 26.308 5.196 23.704 4.104 0.000 25.006 4.858
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Table 6 (cont.ed): Model with shared frailty - Differences between clusters, by European region
and full sample
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Full sample - No Het.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value
Panel C: Central Europe (pˆi1 = 0.21, pˆi2 = 0.79)
Father is retired 0.159 0.366 0.040 0.197 0.000 0.100 0.299
Male (child) 0.580 0.494 0.539 0.498 0.000 0.560 0.496
Married (child) 0.706 0.456 0.715 0.451 0.084 0.711 0.453
High school (father) 0.445 0.497 0.429 0.495 0.005 0.437 0.496
College or more (father) 0.272 0.445 0.253 0.435 0.000 0.263 0.440
High school (child) 0.511 0.500 0.456 0.498 0.000 0.483 0.499
College or more (child) 0.430 0.495 0.488 0.500 0.000 0.459 0.498
Nest-leaving age 29.024 7.055 25.326 4.286 0.000 27.175 6.122
Panel D: Full sample (pˆi1 = 0.32, pˆi2 = 0.68)
Father is retired 0.172 0.377 0.123 0.328 0.000 0.147 0.354
Male (child) 0.574 0.495 0.561 0.496 0.000 0.567 0.495
Married (child) 0.724 0.447 0.779 0.415 0.000 0.751 0.432
High school (father) 0.334 0.472 0.277 0.448 0.000 0.306 0.460
College or more (father) 0.217 0.412 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.190 0.393
High school (child) 0.469 0.499 0.438 0.496 0.000 0.453 0.498
College or more (child) 0.392 0.488 0.351 0.477 0.000 0.371 0.483
Nest-leaving age 28.560 6.299 26.807 5.172 0.000 27.684 5.829
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When restricting the analysis to northern Europe (columns 4 to 6 of Table 5) and central
Europe (columns 7 to 9 of Table 5), I find that the dummy variable for paternal retirement
is no longer statistically significant in any of the two unobserved groups. This lack of
significance can likely be explained by looking at the differences in the fraction of adult
children who left the nest after paternal retirement. Table 3 reveals that such differences
across European regions are enormous, ranging from 42% in southern Europe to 15% in
central Europe and to 6% in northern Europe. In other words, when fathers retire, only
a very limited share of adult offspring in northern and central European countries is still
living with their parents, thus raising concerns about the lack of power in my identification
strategy for these two macro-regions.
Descriptive statistics (see Panel B for northern Europe and Panel C for central Europe)
confirm that young people in Group 1 can still be viewed as “low propensity” nest-leaving
types, with a much larger fraction of retired fathers. To be more precise, in northern and
central Europe, these fractions are approximately 60% higher compared to the mean of the
full sample, and they are four times larger when they are compared to the mean of the
respective Group 2. Moreover, in northern and central Europe, young people belonging to
Group 1 tend to leave the nest later relative to their counterparts in Group 2.
In columns 10 to 12 of Table 5, I report the estimated coefficients obtained from the
pooled sample. While treatment effects of paternal retirement are positive and significant
for Group 1, they are close to zero for Group 2. Similar to the analysis ignoring unobserved
heterogeneity (see column 7 in Table 4), it seems evident that the significant effect for Group
1 on the pooled sample is driven by the strongly significant effect obtained for the same
group in southern Europe. As expected, when examining the descriptive statistics (see
Panel D in Table 6), individuals in Group 1 are characterized by a markedly larger share
of retired fathers compared to those belonging to Group 2 (17% higher with respect to the
mean of the full sample and 40% higher relative to the mean of Group 2) and are more likely
to leave the nest later. It is also worth noting that the estimated probability of belonging
to Group 1 varies substantially with the associated macro-region and is much higher in
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southern Europe (33%) as opposed to northern (6%) and central (21%) Europe. This result
confirms that young people sharing some latent characteristics that make them belong to
the latent class of “late” nest-leavers (Group 1) are concentrated in southern European
countries. Overall, the evidence presented above suggests that, although quantitatively
small, there are positive causal effects of paternal retirement on the timing of children’s
nest-leaving only for southern European countries. The non-significant effects obtained for
northern and central Europe are presumably because most youths have already left their
parental homes at the time of their fathers’ retirement. In the discussion section, I explain
why these findings may differ so largely by European region.
Moreover, Table 7 presents the estimates for the hazard of paternal retirement. In
accordance with the model in which unobserved heterogeneity is not allowed for (see Table
4), the coefficients on eligibility status reveal the significant influence of eligibiliy rules
on actual retirement. These findings are consistent with the available empirical evidence
on the relevance of early retirement incentives (Gruber and Wise 2004). Interestingly, in
the southern European countries, the strength of the estimated effects is larger compared
to that of the other country groups. This may be because Italian, Spanish and Greek
workers have more financial incentives to retire early due to their particularly generous
early retirement benefits with respect to those of other European regions.
Finally, in an attempt to disentangle the treatment effects of paternal retirement on sons
from the effects on daughters in southern Europe, I separately consider the samples of male
and female children. The results for sons and daughters are presented in Table 8. When
restricting the analysis to sons (see columns 2 and 3), the coefficient on paternal retirement
varies between 5.5% for individuals in Group 1 and 1.3% for those belonging to Group 2. A
similar pattern is observed in the regressions for daughters (see columns 5 and 6), with the
difference being that the magnitude for daughters in Group 1 is slightly smaller compared
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to sons in Group 1 (4.9% vs. 5.5%) and the treatment effect for daughters in Group 2 is
no longer significant, which may be partly due to the smaller sample size.. However, these
differences between sons and daughters are not significantly different from zero. In Tables
A1 and A2 in Appendix A, I show that paternal retirement has no significant positive
effects on sons and daughters in northern and central Europe.
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Table 8: Model with shared frailty - Hazard of Nest-Leaving in Southern Europe, Sons and
Daughters
Sample Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2 No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.024*** 0.055*** 0.013** 0.017** 0.049*** 0.011
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Household size -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.006* -0.001 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Bad health (father) 0.007 0.020*** 0.011** 0.004 0.009 0.005
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.334 0.334
(0.325) (0.325)
pˆi2 0.666 0.666
(0.325) (0.325)
Wald test p-value for 0.000
diff. btw. δ(2)and δ(3)
Wald test p-value for 0.00
diff. btw. δ(5)and δ(6)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. (child) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -4,115 -1,431 -2,529 -3,672 -1,255 -2,304
Observations 14,076 14,076 14,076 10,454 10,454 10,454
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform a variety of robustness checks to test how the results change
when I modify the estimation strategy or use a different specification of the model (see
Tables 9 and 10).
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Table 9: Effects of paternal retirement, IV analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample South North Central Overall
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child leaves home
Father is retired 0.159** -0.253 -0.046 0.042
(0.075) (0.235) (0.066) (0.066)
Household size -0.007** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
Bad health (father) 0.014** 0.000 0.014 0.010
(0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008)
Observations 34,462 37,135 54,976 126,573
R2 0.223 0.201 0.221 0.258
First stage F statistic 82.06 9.12 98.99 159.68
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Father is retired
Father is eligible 0.442*** 0.132* 0.246*** 0.454***
(0.020) (0.044) (0.025) (0.009)
Household size 0.005 -0.003 -0.017*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Bad health (father) 0.046*** 0.033* 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 34,462 37,135 54,976 126,573
R2 0.175 0.188 0.214 0.202
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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2.6.1 Instrumental Variable Analysis
Although the bivariate hazard model described in section 4 provides the most appropri-
ate description of the relationship between paternal retirement and the timing of children’s
nest-leaving, there may still be concerns regarding the sensitivity of my results to their
stability or to the parametric assumptions made in the estimation. As noted by Melberg
et al. (2010), in latent class models, the convergence of the likelihood can be vulnerable
to problems due to local optima. To address this concern, I estimate the following linear
version of model (1) using two stage least squares (2SLS):
Pr(Lit = 1) = α+ βRetiredit + γXi + it (2.5)
where the treatment dummy Retiredit and the variable Xi are defined in the same
way as in Section 4. Here, the outcome variable Lit is a dummy taking the value 1 if a
child i residing in a given country left the parental home at age t. Following Manacorda
and Moretti (2006), I focus on youth aged 18 to 30 years.26 Finally, fit represents an
idiosyncratic error term, which is presumably correlated with the outcome variable because
it embodies unobserved factors of fathers, including ability, which might affect children’s
home-leaving decisions. Consistent with previous analysis, I would expect to find a positive
and significant effect of paternal retirement only in southern Europe.
I identify the causal effect of paternal retirement on children’s nest-leaving using cross-
country changes in eligibility rules for early retirement benefits for the period 1961 to 2007
as an instrument for paternal retirement. As discussed in Section 4, this instrument is
recognized to be relevant and arguably exogenous to children’s living arrangements. In
26Alternatively, consistent with Billari and Tabellini (2008), I consider children aged 18 to 35, obtaining similar
results. The results are available from the author upon request.
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this setup, the first stage regression is given by:
Retiredit = δ0 + δ1Eligibilityit + piXi + νit (2.6)
where the dummy Eligibilityit represents the instrument introduced in Section 4. As
previously mentioned, it is important to acknowledge that this instrumental variable strat-
egy is relevant only for the subpopulation of individuals who retire as a consequence of
early retirement schemes.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the 2SLS results. The treatment dummy on paternal re-
tirement is positive and significant at the 5% level only for southern Europe (see column
1). This dummy variable, however, becomes non-significant and negative for northern and
central European countries (see columns 2 and 3). Panel B contains the first-stage results.
As expected, these estimates indicate that eligibility for early retirement benefits is an
important determinant for paternal retirement. Altogether, the IV analysis lends some
additional evidence that for southern Europe there is a positive causal relation between
paternal retirement and children’s nest-leaving, a finding that calls for further explanation.
2.6.2 Additional Sensitivity Checks
As a further check, I investigate the robustness of my estimates to the use of an alter-
native definition of the treatment dummy for paternal retirement. A common concern is
that as children age, they are more likely to leave the parental home regardless of their
fathers’ retirement status. To address this concern, I define a time frame of three years,
and construct a binary variable that is set to 1 if the father retired prior to the child’s
first move-out within the time frame27 and 0 otherwise. This approach is similar in spirit
to that of van Ours (2003), who refers to this time frame as the “incubation period” to
identify a gateway effect of cannabis on cocaine. The results are presented in Panel B of
27I also check the sensitivity of the estimates to time frames of 2 and 4 years and obtain similar results.
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Table 10. Reassuringly, these parameter estimates resemble those obtained in the bench-
mark specification, with the only difference being that in Southern Europe the magnitude
of the estimated effects of paternal retirement becomes slightly smaller.
2.7 Discussion
In the literature on moving-out decisions, what remains largely unexplained is the
mechanism regulating the positive causal relationship between paternal retirement and
children’s nest-leaving. In this section, I start to fill this gap by focusing the analysis on
Italy, Greece and Spain, countries for which I found a positive causal effect of paternal
retirement.28 A unique feature of these southern European countries is that they can be
divided into two groups. One group is composed of Italy and Greece, where there is a
large bonus payment at the time of retirement that amounts to approximately three times
the gross annual salary. The second group includes only Spain, where such severance
payment does not exist.29 My information on severance arrangements is drawn from Holz-
mann et al. (2011), from personal communications with national experts and from other
country-specific sources.30 As previously mentioned, the literature would attribute this
causal relationship mainly to two competing mechanisms. To provide an empirical test
for these two mechanisms, I adopt a differences-in-differences strategy, where Italy and
Greece constitute the treatment group and Spain is the control group, “unaffected” by the
lump-sum payment upon retirement. The key identification assumption for Spain to be a
valid control group is that children’s nest-leaving behavior of Spain and Italy and Greece
would have followed similar trends over time, in the absence of retirement severance pay.
It is plausible to justify this assumption, given that, conditional on country fixed effects,
28Unfortunately, SHARE data does not contain information regarding the reason for children’s nest-
leaving.
29As noted by Garcia-Gomez et al. (2013), Spanish employed that leave employment and transit into
unemployment may receive a severance payment from the employer. To overcome this issue, I excluded from
the analysis individuals who declare themselves as retired because they were made redundant. However, in
Table A6 in Appendix A, I show that the main conclusions are not affected by including these individuals.
30For Italy, information on retirement severance payment is obtained from Miniaci et al. (2003). For
Greece and Spain, institutional details have been integrated by personal communications with Samuel
Bentolila, Olympia Bover, Pilar Garcia-Gomez, Athanasios Tagkalakis and Platon Tinios.
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the southern European countries included in my sample were undergoing similar economic
conditions and were very similar in terms of welfare state regime, family structure and
culture.
To the extent that the Manacorda and Moretti mechanism is at play, I expect pa-
ternal retirement to bribe Italians and Greek adult children to stay at home longer as a
consequence of the positive shock to the family’s liquidity associated with the retirement
severance payment. However, the results reported in Table 11 (columns 1 to 3) are in the
opposite direction. For individuals belonging to Groups 1 and 2, the dummy variable for
paternal retirement remains positive and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level),
with a magnitude of 6.1% and 1.5%, respectively. This result indicates that liquidity prob-
lems faced by fathers at the time of retirement do not provide an entirely satisfactory
explanation. On the other hand, if retirement severance payment mattered, as stressed by
Battistin et al. (2009), I would expect to find no evidence of significant effects of paternal
retirement for Spain. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates presented in columns 4 to 6
largely contradict the prediction of this second hypothesis: for individuals in Group 1, the
estimated coefficient on paternal retirement retains its significance, whereas for those in
Group 2, the magnitude of the coefficient of interest remains substantially unchanged with
respect to the estimate in column 3, but is significant only at the 10% level. This result is
what I expected given the reduced sample size.
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Table 11: Potential mechanisms: Manacorda and Moretti (2006) vs. Battistin et al. (2009)
hypotheses
Sample Italy and Greece Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2 No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.024*** 0.061*** 0.015** 0.031*** 0.049*** 0.020*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012)
Household size -0.005 -0.007 -0.005* -0.011** -0.019*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Bad health (father) 0.005 0.020*** 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.012
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.334 0.334
(0.325) (0.325)
pˆi2 0.666 0.666
(0.325) (0.325)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. (child) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -5,508 -1,942 -3,388 -2,337 -767 -1,501
Observations 16,960 16,960 16,960 6,820 6,820 6,820
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The main conclusion that I draw from this empirical test is that the decline in children’s
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cohabitation at paternal retirement cannot be entirely ascribed to liquidity problems or a
boost in family’s income due to severance payment.
One may still be concerned that Spain is not a comparable control group or that Italy
and Greece do not represent an appropriate treatment group because self-employed workers
are not entitled to retirement severance payment. In order to address these concerns, I
propose an additional test: for Italy and Greece, I use the employed as the treatment
and self-employed31 as the control group. Descriptive statistics in Table 12 demonstrate
that employed and self-employed do not differ significantly in a large number of observable
characteristics, thus providing support for the claim that self-employed workers are a valid
counterfactual. The results reported in Table 13 indicate that there are positive causal
effects of paternal retirement on the timing of children’s nest-leaving for the treatment
(columns 1 to 3) and control group (columns 4 to 6), which I interpret as corroborating
evidence that the drop in paternal post-retirement income or retirement severance payment
do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the mechanism behind children’s nest-leaving
upon paternal retirement.
31Self-employed refer to those individuals who have been self-employed at any stage during their career.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics, Employed vs. Self-employed
Variable Employed Self-employed
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff.
p-value
Age (father) 689 69.869 7.199 240 70.222 6.723 0.534
Household size 689 2.334 0.653 240 2.320 0.718 0.799
Retired 689 0.932 0.252 240 0.872 0.335 0.006
Retirement age 642 58.555 4.719 209 61.701 4.287 0.000
Bad health 689 0.412 0.493 240 0.325 0.470 0.026
High school (father) 689 0.192 0.394 240 0.123 0.329 0.024
College or more (father) 689 0.075 0.264 240 0.044 0.206 0.123
High school (child) 689 0.492 0.500 240 0.463 0.500 0.469
College or more (child) 689 0.266 0.442 240 0.227 0.420 0.255
Nest-leaving age (child) 689 27.145 5.121 240 26.931 5.139 0.601
Married (child) 689 0.774 0.419 240 0.818 0.387 0.180
Notes: This table reports the observations from the cross-sectional sample before reshaping it as a longitudinal
dataset. All the samples contain individuals for whom information on children’s nest-leaving age and paternal
education is not missing and exclude children who were less than 18. The paternal sample consists of all
individuals who are either working or retired.
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Table 13: Potential mechanisms: Employed vs. Self-employed in Italy and Greece
Sample Employed Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2 No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.018*** 0.057*** 0.011* 0.037*** 0.053*** 0.028*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015)
Household size -0.009** -0.005 -0.007 0.003 -0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Bad health (father) 0.007 0.030*** 0.003 -0.005 -0.013 0.010
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.334 0.334
(0.325) (0.325)
pˆi2 0.666 0.666
(0.325) (0.325)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. (child) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -5,508 -1,942 -3,388 -2,337 -767 -1,501
Observations 12,901 12,901 12,901 4,059 4,059 4,059
Notes: Logit estimations; average marginal effects reported. pˆi1 and pˆi2 are the estimated probability
to belong to unobserved heterogeneity Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. The marginal effects are
unweighted (col. 1, 4), and weighted, using as weights pˆi1 (col. 2, 5) or pˆi2 (col. 3, 6). The sample sizes
take into account the longitudinal structure of the data. Education is an indicator for father’s college or more
(ISCED≥ 5, tertiaty education) and high school education (ISCED=3 or 4, secondary and post-secondary
education). Bad health is an indicator that takes value 1 if father’s self-reported health is less than good.
Notice that observations for which the probability of belonging to Group 1 and Group 2 is equal to zero
are not included in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
108
For this reason, it seems worthy to investigate other potential channels. In their study
on the intergenerational effects of Italian pension reforms on fertility, Battistin et al. (2013)
argue that the rise in retirement age has reduced the amount of informal child care provided
by grandparents, which in turn has determined an increase in the children’s age at first
child and of home leaving. While this scenario can be applied to other southern European
countries, including Spain and Greece, in the present study the negative shock to the
provision of informal child care is not likely to be a major determinant for the prolonged
cohabitation with parents. It is in fact well-known that grandmothers are the main provider
of informal child care arrangements to their grandchildren (see, for instance, Richter et al.
1994). A similar result is also obtained in Battistin et al. (2013), who show that it is the
grandmothers’ provision of informal child care that plays a primary role in their children’s
fertility decisions, finding that an additional grandmother at home raises her daughter’s
probability of being mother by 4%. However, as argued previously, female partners are
excluded from my analysis. I also provide a more formal test to address the concern that
individuals in a couple may plan their retirement closely together (Stancanelli 2012). In
Table 14, I show that, even when focusing only on fathers whose spouses have never worked,
there still exists a positive and quantitatively similar causal effect of paternal retirement
on the hazard of children’s nest-leaving. It may be argued, however, that some evidence in
favor of this interpretation cannot be totally ruled out given that for those in Group 2 the
coefficient on paternal retirement is close to zero, thus revealing the potential presence of
an effect originating from the grandparents’ supply of informal child care on top of other
unexplained factors for the “early” nest-leaving types.
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Table 14: Potential mechanisms: Fathers whose wives never worked
Sample Southern Europe
(1) (2) (3)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.016** 0.054*** 0.005
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Household size -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.015**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Bad health (father) 0.004 0.013 0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.334
(0.325)
pˆi2 0.666
(0.325)
Country F.E. YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. (child) YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -7,883 -2,726 -4,905
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,435
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
It is therefore worthwhile to investigate a number of preference-related reasons why
children’s coresidence may decline immediately after paternal retirement.
Although it is not a contribution of this paper, it remains to be explored why the
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coefficient on paternal is not statistically significant in northern and central Europe. As
argued in Section 5, a plausible explanation is that there is not enough power in my
identification strategy for these two macro-regions because only a very limited share of
adult offspring left their parental home after paternal retirement. However, this finding
raises the issue of why young people living in northern and central Europe leave home
much earlier relative to their counterparts in southern Europe. Such disparities in the
age of home-leaving can be reconciled with cross-regional differences in housing markets
(Alessie et al. 2006), family ties (Alesina and Giuliano 2011) and labor market conditions
(Card and Lemieux 2000).
2.8 Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between paternal retirement and the timing of
housing emancipation of young adults in Europe, with the aim of testing empirically which
of the mechanisms proposed in the literature dominates in practice. Taking advantage of
the retrospective dimension of my micro data, I use a bivariate discrete hazard model with
shared frailty and exploit cross-country variation in early retirement legislation. Overall,
my regression results suggest that there is a significant influence of paternal retirement
on the probability of first nest-leaving of children living in Southern European countries.
However, there is no evidence of significant effects on children residing in Northern and
Central European countries. I interpret this evidence as indicating that paternal retirement
is a relevant explanatory variable of coresidence decisions only in Southern Europe, once
differences in institutions, culture and other unobservables are controlled for.
To shed some light into the mechanism, I provide an empirical test for the two main
competing channels by which paternal retirement may be thought to affect children’s
nest-leaving. Comparing my cross-country evidence for Southern Europe with important
country-specific evidence obtained for Italy from two other studies (Manacorda and Moretti
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2006; Battistin et al. 2009), it seems plausible to conclude that the decline in children’s
co-residence around paternal retirement does not seem to be driven by changes in par-
ents’ budget constraints. In addition, I test the plausibility of the argument proposed
by Battistin et al. (2013); however, I do not find conclusive evidence that the supply of
informal child care provided by grandparents is a major determinant for children’s moving-
out. Rather, one needs to look for channels involving negative externalities in preferences
between parents and children.
Empirical evidence that paternal retirement can affect children’s nest-leaving has im-
portant policy implications. It is well-known that because the population is rapidly aging in
Europe, it is becoming increasingly important to maintain the long-term financial sustain-
ability of pension systems. To achieve this goal, in the recent past European governments
have primarily adopted a number of pension reforms that have raised the retirement age or
removed financial incentives to early retirement. However, the results of this paper suggest
that in Southern Europe policy makers should also be aware that there may be potential
unintended and undesirable consequences of pension reforms on moving-out decisions of
young people.
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Appendix A: Supplemental Tables
Table A1: Determinants of the Hazard of Nest-Leaving in Northern Europe, Sons and Daughters
Sample Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2 No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.028 0.029 -0.099 -0.005 0.012 -0.100
(0.038) (0.027) (0.078) (0.020) (0.036) (0.088)
Household size 0.012 0.033*** -0.037 0.008 0.028* -0.032
(0.013) (0.004) (0.027) (0.010) (0.016) (0.025)
Bad health (father) -0.014 -0.002 -0.071** -0.050*** -0.029*** -0.162***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.009) (0.044)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.065 0.065
(0.196) (0.196)
pˆi2 0.935 0.935
(0.196) (0.196)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. (child) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -3,837 -2,984 -785 -3,050 -2,360 -634
Observations 7,740 7,740 6,105 5,453 5,453 4,508
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A2: Determinants of the Hazard of Nest-Leaving in Central Europe, Sons and Daughters
Sample Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2 No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.012 0.014 0.010 -0.012 -0.005 -0.058
(0.011) (0.011) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.036)
Household size -0.017*** -0.016** -0.007 -0.011** -0.010* 0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Bad health (father) -0.004 -0.002 -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.210 0.210
(0.290) (0.290)
pˆi2 0.790 0.790
(0.290) (0.290)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E, (child) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -6,380 -5,011 -1,038 -5,760 -4,489 -950
Observations 16,069 16,069 12,062 12,629 12,629 10,052
Notes: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table A3: Differences between clusters, Sons and Daughters in Southern Europe
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Full sample - No Het.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value
Panel A: Sons (pˆi1 = 0.33, pˆi2 = 0.67)
Father is retired 0.253 0.435 0.203 0.402 0.000 0.228 0.419
Married (child) 0.812 0.391 0.792 0.406 0.003 0.802 0.398
High school (father) 0.136 0.343 0.142 0.349 0.310 0.139 0.345
College or more (father) 0.073 0.260 0.063 0.244 0.020 0.068 0.252
High school (child) 0.396 0.489 0.397 0.489 0.913 0.397 0.489
College or more (child) 0.255 0.436 0.230 0.421 0.000 0.242 0.428
Nest-leaving age 30.635 5.127 30.120 5.139 0.000 30.377 5.139
Panel B: Daughters (pˆi1 = 0.33, pˆi2 = 0.67)
Father is retired 0.243 0.429 0.183 0.386 0.000 0.213 0.409
Married (child) 0.867 0.340 0.883 0.322 0.313 0.875 0.330
High school (father) 0.168 0.374 0.128 0.335 0.000 0.148 0.355
College or more (father) 0.099 0.299 0.084 0.278 0.000 0.092 0.288
High school (child) 0.410 0.492 0.460 0.498 0.000 0.435 0.495
College or more (child) 0.362 0.481 0.243 0.429 0.009 0.302 0.459
Nest-leaving age 29.352 5.368 28.237 5.228 0.045 28.794 5.327
Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using the longitudinal sample. pˆi1 and pˆi2 are the estimated probability to belong to
unobserved heterogeneity Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. Observations with an estimated probability below the median
are assigned to Group 1, whereas the remaining individuals are assigned to Group 2.
Table A4: Differences between clusters, Sons and Daughters in Northern Europe
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Full sample - No Het.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value
Panel A: Sons (pˆi1 = 0.07, pˆi2 = 0.93)
Father is retired 0.080 0.272 0.020 0.140 0.000 0.050 0.218
Married (child) 0.700 0.458 0.659 0.474 0.000 0.679 0.466
High school (father) 0.302 0.459 0.335 0.472 0.001 0.318 0.465
College or more (father) 0.179 0.383 0.275 0.447 0.000 0.227 0.419
High school (child) 0.475 0.499 0.438 0.496 0.668 0.457 0.498
College or more (child) 0.331 0.471 0.384 0.486 0.000 0.357 0.479
Nest-leaving age 26.981 5.288 24.175 4.251 0.000 25.578 4.997
Panel B: Daughters (pˆi1 = 0.07, pˆi2 = 0.93)
Father is retired 0.059 0.235 0.016 0.125 0.000 0.037 0.189
Married (child) 0.723 0.448 0.702 0.458 0.092 0.712 0.452
High school (father) 0.235 0.424 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.307 0.461
College or more (father) 0.260 0.439 0.291 0.454 0.009 0.276 0.446
High school (child) 0.450 0.498 0.485 0.500 0.009 0.467 0.498
College or more (child) 0.370 0.483 0.402 0.490 0.012 0.386 0.486
Nest-leaving age 25.346 4.949 23.040 3.734 0.000 24.193 4.532
Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using the longitudinal sample. pˆi1 and pˆi2 are the estimated probability to belong to
unobserved heterogeneity Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. Observations with an estimated probability below the median
are assigned to Group 1, whereas the remaining individuals are assigned to Group 2.
Table A5: Differences between clusters, Sons and Daughters in Central Europe
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Full sample - No Het.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value
Panel A: Sons (pˆi1 = 0.21, pˆi2 = 0.79)
Father is retired 0.156 0.363 0.053 0.225 0.000 0.105 0.305
Married (child) 0.690 0.463 0.696 0.460 0.360 0.693 0.461
High school (father) 0.443 0.497 0.446 0.497 0.718 0.444 0.496
College or more (father) 0.289 0.454 0.238 0.426 0.000 0.264 0.440
High school (child) 0.513 0.500 0.468 0.499 0.000 0.491 0.499
College or more (child) 0.429 0.495 0.462 0.499 0.000 0.446 0.497
Nest-leaving age 29.595 6.959 25.980 4.715 0.000 27.787 6.211
Panel B: Daughters (pˆi1 = 0.21, pˆi2 = 0.79)
Father is retired 0.156 0.363 0.031 0.173 0.000 0.093 0.290
Married (child) 0.727 0.446 0.739 0.439 0.124 0.733 0.442
High school (father) 0.440 0.496 0.416 0.493 0.006 0.428 0.494
College or more (father) 0.260 0.438 0.264 0.441 0.595 0.262 0.439
High school (child) 0.504 0.500 0.444 0.497 0.000 0.474 0.499
College or more (child) 0.440 0.496 0.513 0.500 0.000 0.477 0.499
Nest-leaving age 28.211 7.106 24.590 3.613 0.000 26.400 5.917
Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using the longitudinal sample. pˆi1 and pˆi2 are the estimated probability to belong to
unobserved heterogeneity Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. Observations with an estimated probability below the median
are assigned to Group 1, whereas the remaining individuals are assigned to Group 2.
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Table A6: Potential mechanisms: Manacorda and Moretti (2006) vs. Battistin et al. (2009)
hypotheses
Sample Italy and Greece Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unobserved Group No Het. Group 1 Group 2 No Het. Group 1 Group 2
Father is retired 0.024*** 0.061*** 0.015** 0.025*** 0.047*** 0.015
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011)
Household size -0.005 -0.007 -0.005* -0.008* -0.017*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Bad health (father) 0.005 0.020*** 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.014
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Mass points :
pˆi1 0.334 0.334
(0.325) (0.325)
pˆi2 0.666 0.666
(0.325) (0.325)
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Education F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (father) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth order F.E. (child) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -5,508 -1,942 -3,388 -2,337 -767 -1,501
Observations 16,960 16,960 16,960 7,570 7,570 7,570
Notes:* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Chapter 3
The Effect of Divorce Risk on the Wealth and
Retirement Security of Households
Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of an increase in the risk of divorce on the wealth
and financial retirement security of married couples. My empirical strategy exploits changes in
divorce laws occurred between the late 1970s and the 2000s in Europe as an exogenous shock to
the risk of marital breakup. Across countries and over time, these laws shifted the ground for
divorce from mutual consent to unilateral choice. This “divorce revolution” allows for the use of a
quasi-experimental design that exploits the time and country variation in these laws to identify the
empirical relationship between divorce risk and the wealth and retirement security of households. By
employing a unique dataset that contains detailed information on the wealth and the marital history
of the couple, I discuss and test the potential mechanisms by which the divorce legislation affects
the retirement well-being of married couples. Overall, my results lend support to the precautionary
motive for saving. The increase in the risk of divorce leads to a significant asset accumulation of
married couples around retirement.
3.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, a substantial body of research has investigated the effects of unilat-
eral divorce laws on a large array of household outcomes, such as divorce rates (Friedberg
1998; Wolfers 2006), the welfare of children (Gruber 2004), marital conflict (Stevenson and
Wolfers 2006) and women’s labor supply decisions (Gray 1998; Stevenson 2007). However,
little attention to date has been given to the potential effects of divorce laws on dimen-
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sions related to the retirement standard of living of elderly people. In this paper, I seek
to fill this gap by exploring the causal impact of an increase in divorce risk on the wealth
accumulation of elderly people in Europe. This empirical relationship can be identified
by the quasi-natural experiment provided by the wave of liberal divorce reforms that took
place in Europe during the last four decades of the 20th century. Across countries and
over time, these laws made divorce less difficult: the legal regime switched from “fault di-
vorce” to “no-fault divorce” and in most cases the grounds for divorce shifted from mutual
agreement to unilateral choice. Evidence from European countries shows that the shift to
unilateral divorce regime was accompanied by a rapid rise in divorce rates, with an average
increase of about 0.3-0.4 annual divorces per 1000 people (González and Viitanen 2009).
This relationship has also generated a great deal of attention from policy makers because it
lies at the heart of the public debate over the retirement security of the elderly population.
There are increasing concerns that many baby boomers are approaching retirement with
low levels of financial wealth and virtually no assets other than their homes (Lusardi and
Mitchell 2007). This is a particular concern for women who tend to live longer than men,
have less attachment to labor force, earn less and are more financially illiterate.
Some recent theoretical papers emphasize that changes in the likelihood of divorce may
affect the incentive to save of households; however, researchers are still puzzled about the
possible mechanisms underlying this relationship. There are two main competing explana-
tions through which an increase in the risk of marital breakup may influence households
saving behavior. On the one hand, Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (1997) show that increases in
marital dissolution encourage household saving. They attribute this rise in saving to stan-
dard precautionary motives: since households cannot insure themselves against divorce, a
greater risk of marital dissolution induce married couples to save more. On the other hand,
Mazzocco et al. (2007) stress that an increase in the probability of divorce would make
saving while married more risky because asset division laws tend to distribute resources
equally or equitably, thereby creating incentives to increase current consumption. This
pattern is particularly relevant for marriages in which spouses face a high probability of
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divorce. Only a few contributions, however, have made an attempt to empirically test
which of the channels dominates in practice. Voena (2013) develops a model to evaluate
the impact of divorce laws and different property rights regimes on the intertemporal la-
bor supply and saving behavior of married couples. She tests the model using US panel
data and provides support for the precautionary saving channel by showing that when
the risk of marital breakup increases and assets are equally divided among spouses, men
tend to increase savings to offset the possible loss of half of their assets to wives if divorce
occurs. Similarly, Gonzalez and Ozcan (2013), using Irish panel data, find that the shift
from mutual consent to unilateral divorce leads to a significant increase in the propensity
to save by married individuals. The positive relationship between risk of family disrup-
tion and households asset accumulation, however, is not entirely consistent with the work
by Stevenson (2007), which provides evidence of a decline in the propensity to undertake
marriage-specific investments, such as supporting a spouse through school or buying a
home, with the relation varying with the property division regime prevailing in the US
states.
Overall, these studies do not consider the retirement well-being of married couples as
the outcome and limit their analyses to specific countries (US and Ireland). Therefore,
a key emphasis on retirement security and a cross-country analysis allows this study to
address questions that other researchers have not. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first paper to estimate the impact of different divorce law reforms on the retirement security
of married couples and evaluate the relative weight of the two competing explanations using
a European dataset. To achieve identification, I take advantage of an exogenous increase
in the risk of divorce provided by the unilateral divorce legislation in Europe and estimate
a fixed-effects OLS regression to identify its effect on household retirement well-being.
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3.2 Data and Institutional Context
In my empirical analysis, I use data from the the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE). This survey collects detailed information on demographics, current
socio-economic status, health, expectations as well as social and family networks for na-
tionally representative samples of European individuals aged fifty and over who speak the
official language of each country, and do not live abroad or in an institution, plus their
spouses or partners irrespective of age. The main advantage of this data source is related
to the representativeness of the sample of elderly people in Europe because this survey
is constructed to ensure comparability of the analysis across the different countries. In
this study, I use data from the third wave collected in 2008/2009. This wave, known as
SHARELIFE, focuses on many aspects of life histories of respondents and it is particularly
suitable for my investigation, since it provides uniquely detailed data on individuals’ mar-
ital histories. In this paper, I present evidence from eleven countries for which I was able
to collect information on unilateral divorce laws. These countries represent the various
regions of continental Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Sweden and Denmark) through
Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands)
and the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain and Greece).
In my sample selection, because economic outcomes are measured at the household
level, I constrain the sample to couples who are still in their first marriage at the time of
the interview. Consistent with Alessie et al. (2013), I restrict my attention to spouses born
between 1931 and 1952. The choice of this interval allows me to consider all the couples,
aged 55-75 in the interview year of wave 2, who married before or after the introduction
of unilateral divorce in their corresponding country. I also use data from the second wave
of SHARE because information on economic well-being later in life were not collected
in SHARELIFE. These indicators include total net worth, financial assets, real assets and
home-ownership. To be more precise, the total net worth is computed as the sum of the net
values of: (a) the primary residence net of mortgage; (b) other real estate; (c) business; (d)
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cars; (e) savings, stocks and bonds, mutual funds, IRA’s and life insurances. Imputations
on net worth are provided in the SHARE data to correct for missing values. This net
worth is expressed in PPP-adjusted Euros. Home-ownership is measured as a dichotomous
variable that takes value 0 if a respondent does not own the house he or she occupies at
the time of the interview and 1 if he or she does.
As regards the institutional context, I use data on unilateral divorce laws across the
above-mentioned European countries, building on the work by Viitanen (2009) and Kneip
et al. (2009). The table below illustrates the year of introduction of de-facto unilateral
divorce laws and the distribution of the sample of couples married before and after the
unilateral divorce laws across countries. A feature worth stressing is that there is a large
multi-country variability in the year of introduction of unilateral divorce laws. Especially
striking is that the year of introduction ranges from 1915 in Sweden to 2000 in Switzerland
and 2010 in Italy. The distribution of total net worth and other wealth components appears
in Table 2. The financial wealth distribution is very skewed: households’ median financial
wealth is €18,607, while the mean is approximately three times greater (€51,766). Table
3 shows the distribution of total net worth and home ownership by educational groups as
well as for couples without children.
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Table 1: De-Facto Unilateral Divorce Laws by Country, Sample of Married Households 1931-1952
Country Year of No unilateral divorce Unilateral divorce Total
introduction at time first marriage at time first marriage
Austria 1978 190 28 218
Belgium 1975 633 167 800
Denmark 1970 264 292 556
France 1976 459 143 602
Germany (FRG) 1977 372 83 455
Greece 1983 823 86 909
Italy 2010 963 0 963
Netherlands 1971 380 292 672
Spain 1981 587 53 640
Sweden 1915 0 454 454
Switzerland 2000 340 1 341
Total 5,011 1,599 6,610
Notes: Source: González et al. (2009), Kneip et al. (2009), Reinhold et al. (2012). Column 2 shows the
year when de facto unilateral, no-fault divorce was first allowed.
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Table 2: Distribution of total net worth and wealth components, Sample of Households (€2007)
Percentile Total net worth (€) Housing wealth (€) Financial wealth (€)
p5 9,599 1,924 -1,368
p10 34,902 8,928 0
p25 116,375 93,738 2,553
p50 222,097 184,330 18,607
p75 381,705 303,004 64,028
p90 558,648 462,815 158,238
p95 682,896 575,941 227,752
Mean 270,333 218,568 51,766
Std dev 209,533 178,492 80,916
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Table 3: Total net worth and home ownership by demographic group, Sample of Households
(€2007)
Group 25th pctl Median Mean 75th pctl N % Owner % Owner N
first house second house
Education
<HS 86,509 166,527 208,366 293,364 2,730 0.82 0.24 2,500
HS graduate 127,292 236,395 272,263 384,953 1,996 0.81 0.24 1,850
Some college 166,588 272,035 313,267 417,797 244 0.82 0.41 225
College graduate 191,894 326,757 362,748 495,397 1,603 0.87 0.34 1,483
>College 268,986 363,765 460,118 602,399 40 0.89 0.46 35
Children
None 103,923 214,921 261,748 363,248 378 0.78 0.23 340
Some 116,660 222,732 270,853 382,775 6,247 0.83 0.27 5,765
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3.3 Empirical Model
To examine how an increase in the risk of divorce generated by the shift to unilateral
divorce laws affects the retirement well-being of married couples, I estimate the following
fixed-effects OLS regression:
retirement wealthij = β0 + β1Degree ofexposureij + γXi +
∑
j
Country fixed effectsj+∑
i
Y ear of marriage fixed effectsi+
∑
c
Cohort fixed effectsc + ij
where the dependent variable, retirement wealthij , is a measure of retirement pre-
paredness for household i living in country j, i.e., the total net worth, financial assets, the
total value of non-housing assets and home ownership. It is important to include a measure
for retirement wealth. This inclusion will be done in a subsequent version of the paper.
It is worth stressing that all economic variables are defined at the time of the household
interview, which rules out the possibility of using a differences-in-differences approach.
Degree of exposureij measures the exposure intensity, i.e., the ratio between the numbers
of years the household was exposed to unilateral divorce and the marriage duration. The
rationale for using this continuous variable is that a couple might have married before the
law change but may have spent most of their marrriage during the period in which the
unilateral regime was in place. Formally, the variable can be written in the following way:
Degree of exposureij =

(years of exposure)ij/(years since marriage)i if couple i married before UDL
1 if couple i married after UDL
Therefore, I construct the variable of interest in such a way that it depends on three
factors: the country j in which the reform took place, the couple’s year of marriage, and
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the year when unilateral divorce law was first allowed. The coefficient of main interest β1
identifies whether the retirement wealth is larger for households for whom divorce becomes
less costly at the time of first marriage. Equation (1) then includes a set of country, year of
marriage and cohort dummies. X is a vector of household-level controls, such as household
size and education. Finally, ij represents an idiosyncratic error term.
I identify the causal effect of the risk of divorce on the wealth of married couples
around retirement by exploiting the variation provided by divorce laws over couple’s year
of marriage and across European countries. The key identification assumption is that
changes in divorce laws generate an exogenous increase in the risk of marital dissolution.
In other words, these laws provide a source of variation in divorce risk that is credibly
exogenous and unlikely to be related to unobservable characteristics of spouses that might
explain the different wealth accumulation behaviors around retirement. While it seems
plausible to argue that the timing of divorce laws came as a surprise to married couples,
one may still be concerned that in some cases the precise timing of divorce laws may not
occur randomly. The main threat to identification is that couples may be able to anticipate
when the unilateral divorce laws will become effective, and in response to this expected
event, they may modify their year of marriage. As a result, the anticipation of unilateral
divorce laws by couples would violate the identifying assumption described above, thereby
producing biased estimates. In order to test for this possibility, in the robustness analysis
I exclude spouses who married in the close vicinity of the divorce laws and show that my
results remain substantially unchanged.
3.4 Results
Table 4 and Table 5 present the estimation results of main interest. In column 1 of Table 4
I find that a one standard deviation increase in the exposure to divorce laws induce couples
to accumulate more assets during retirement. The magnitude of the effects is large: a one
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standard deviation increases wealth accumulation by approximately 20% for total wealth
(see column 1 of Table 4), 53% for financial wealth (see column 2 of Table 4) and 18% for
real wealth (see column 3 of Table 4).
Table 4: Naive OLS - logs - Sample of Married Couples
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
Total wealth - logs Financial wealth - logs Real wealth - logs
Degree of exposure 0.196** 0.528*** 0.179*
(0.085) (0.103) (0.094)
Country F.E. YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (for each spouse) YES YES YES
Years married (quadratic) YES YES YES
Family size YES YES YES
Observations 6,134 5,229 6,055
R2 0.061 0.203 0.064
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household’s country and year of marriage. The degree of
exposure is defined as the ratio between the years of exposure to UDL and the marriage duration. The dependent
variable is in logs. Degree of exposure is standardized. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Naive OLS - levels - Sample of Married Couples
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
Total wealth - levels Financial wealth - levels Real wealth - levels
Degree of exposure 112,245*** 37,813*** 74,432**
(37,753) (12,346) (35,083)
Country F.E. YES YES YES
Cohort F.E. (for each spouse) YES YES YES
Years married (quadratic) YES YES YES
Family size YES YES YES
Observations 6,191 6,191 6,191
R2 0.076 0.188 0.065
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household’s country and year of marriage. The degree of
exposure is defined as the ratio between the years of exposure to UDL and the marriage duration. The dependent
variable is in levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.5 Conclusion
The risk of family disruption may have potential effects on several important dimensions
related to household well-being. In this paper, I examine how the risk of divorce affects
the wealth accumulation of elderly people, exploiting divorce laws in Europe. Overall,
the results indicate that the shift from mutual agreement to unilateral divorce determine
a significant accumulation of wealth by married couples around retirement, which offers
support to the standard precautionary motive for saving.
133
References
Alessie, Rob, Viola Angelini, and Peter van Santen (2013). “Pension wealth and household
savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE” European Economic Review.
Cubeddu, Luis, and Jose V. Rios-Rull (1997). “Marital Risk and Capital Accumula-
tion.” Staff Report 235, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Dewilde, Caroline, Karel Van den Bosch, and Aaron Van den Heede (2010). “Separa-
tion: Consequences for Wealth in Later Life.” In A. Börsch-Supan, M. Brandt, K. Hank,
and M. Schröder (Eds.), The individual and the welfare state, life histories in Europe (pp.
103-114). Heidelberg: Springer.
Friedberg, Leora (1998). “Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from
Panel Data.” American Economic Review, Vol. 88(3):608-627.
González, Libertad, and Tarja K. Viitanen (2009). “The effect of divorce laws on
divorce rates in Europe” European Economic Review, Vol. 53: 127-138
González, Libertad, and Berkay Ozcan (2013). “The risk of divorce and Household
Saving Behavior” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 48: 404-434
Gray, Jeffrey (1998). “Divorce-law Changes, Household Bargaining and Female Labor
Supply.” American Economic Review, Vol. 88(3): 628-642.
Gruber, Jonathan (2004). “Is making divorce easier bad for children? The long-run
implications of unilateral divorce.” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 22(4): 799-833.
Kneip, Thorsten, and Gerrit Bauer (2009), “Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce
rates in Western Europe?” Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 71, pp. 592-607.
Lusardi, Annamaria, and Olivia S. Mitchell (2008). “Planning and Financial Literacy:
How Do Women Fare?” American Economic Review, Vol. 98(2): 413-417.
Mazzocco, Maurizio, Claudia Ruiz, and Shintaro Yamaguchi (2007). “Labor Supply,
Wealth Dynamics, and Marriage Decisions.” UCLA. Unpublished.
134
Munnell, Alicia (2004). “Why Are So Many Older Women Poor?” Just the Facts 10,
Center for Retirement Research.
Reinhold, Steffen, Thorsten Kneip, and Gerrit Bauer (2012). “The long run conse-
quences of unilateral divorce laws on children - evidence from SHARELIFE” Journal of
Population Economics
Stevenson, Betsey (2007). “The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital”
Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 25: 75-94
Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers (2006). “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
Divorce Laws and Family Distress” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121(1): 267-288.
Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers (2007). “Marriage and divorce: Changes and
their driving forces.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21(2): 27-52.
Voena, Alessandra (2011). “Yours, Mine and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the In-
tertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?” Job Market Paper.
Wolfers, Justin (2006). “Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Recon-
ciliation and New Results.” American Economic Review, Vol. 96(5):1802-1820.
